Editor's note - On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Liberation of the South and National Reunification Day (April 30, 1975 - April 30, 2025), from today's issue, Nhan Dan Newspaper opens the column "50 years of Liberation of the South and National Reunification Day" to widely propagate to the entire Party, people and army about the stature, value and great historical significance of the resistance war against the US to save the country, the Great Victory of Spring 1975; raise awareness, foster revolutionary ideals and people's belief in the cause of innovation, industrialization, modernization of the country and international integration under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
On April 30, 1975, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign succeeded, marking the complete victory of the struggle to unify the country. It was the result of 21 years of steadfast fighting for the goal of “Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom”, to successfully implement the plan to liberate the South that our Party and State had worked hard to build.
On January 27, 1973, the Paris Agreement was signed, the Vietnamese army and people fulfilled President Ho Chi Minh's instruction to "fight to drive the Americans out", which was an important premise for "advancing to fight to overthrow the puppet regime", achieving the goal of unifying the country. To lead our army and people to achieve that goal, from April 1973, the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army established a unit called the Central Group, including comrades: Vu Lang - Director of the Department of Operations and Deputy Directors Vo Quang Ho, Le Huu Duc, led by Deputy Chief of the General Staff Le Trong Tan, with the task of drafting a plan to liberate the South and submitting it to the Politburo. After more than a year, with five revisions, on May 16, 1974, the draft strategic plan to liberate the South with code number 133/TG1 was completed. That was the process of finding the answer "How to create opportunities? What should be done to seize the opportunity and not miss it? What is the strategic direction?
How to fight to destroy the puppet army's battle group and division?" (1). The possibility of US intervention or return if we fight big?... To find the answer is a whole process of grasping the reality of the battlefield, the domestic and world situation; it is a process of discussion, calculation, consideration, and selection of solutions between the strategic command agency and the leaders and commanders of the battlefields.
On July 21, 1974, at the senior cadres' convalescence area in Do Son (Hai Phong), First Secretary Le Duan worked with the Central Group, emphasizing the task of creating opportunities, seizing opportunities, and promoting opportunities to achieve complete victory. He requested that we find the way to achieve the greatest and fastest victory, making it impossible for the US to react and for other countries to intervene; the main force must advance to destroy each division of the enemy in 1975, expand the liberated areas behind the enemy, create an advantageous position for us, and must strive to achieve a decisive victory in the next few years.
Implementing the direction of the First Secretary, the Central Group continued to research and discuss; consulted with generals and senior officers; on August 26, 1974, the Plan for Victory in the South was completed, planned to be implemented in two steps: Step one, in 1975, launch a wide-ranging attack across three regions, basically defeat the enemy's pacification program, destroy and disintegrate an important part of the main force of the Saigon army; step two, in 1976, carry out a general offensive - general uprising, completely liberate the South, complete the cause of resistance against the US, save the country. During the process of building and completing the draft strategic plan, the Central Group focused on researching and discussing the main direction of attack and the main target for the initial step.
At the end of August 1974, the Central Office for Southern Vietnam and the Military Commission of the Region sent out the operational plan for the 1974-1975 dry season, with the determination to complete the liberation of the South in the two years of 1975-1976. Thus, both plans, one directed and guided by the Politburo, the other built right on the battlefield, were unanimous in their determination to achieve decisive victory within a few years. On September 30, 1974, under the chairmanship of comrade Le Duan, the Politburo entered a conference to discuss the draft strategic plan prepared by the Central Group. Also attending were members of the Central Military Commission and comrade Vo Chi Cong - Deputy Secretary of the Central Office for Southern Vietnam, in charge of the Secretary of the Regional Party Committee V, and Political Commissar of Military Region V.
After two days of listening to the General Staff present the situation in the South and the strategic combat plan, the conference listened to comrade Le Trong Tan report on the draft strategic plan determined to complete the liberation of the South in 1975 and 1976. After the discussion, the Politburo believed that we were now much stronger than the enemy; with such a comparison of forces, no matter how much the US intervened, it would not be able to save the collapse of the Saigon army and government.
The Politburo determined that 1975 was a pivotal year, creating conditions for the final victory in 1976; it was necessary to create an element of surprise that could lead to leaps in development and in any situation, the opportunity must not be missed when the strategic opportunity appeared. To proactively seize the strategic opportunity, the mobile main force must be prepared to fight in both strategic directions: the Central Highlands, focusing on the southern Central Highlands, which was an important strategic direction; the Southeast was the final decisive direction, in which the Central Highlands was chosen as the main battlefield in the large and widespread offensive in 1975.
On October 8, 1974, the conference adjourned, and comrade Le Duan affirmed: “After more than a week of work, our Politburo has unanimously resolved to complete the cause of the people's national democratic revolution in the South” (2). More than two months later, on December 18, 1974, the Politburo continued to meet to discuss the plan to liberate the South. During the discussion, the Conference agreed on the plan proposed by the Central Military Commission Standing Committee: choosing the main direction of attack in the Central Highlands, with the key target being Buon Ma Thuot to open the strategic offensive in 1975.
During the conference, the victory of the Route 14 - Phuoc Long Campaign (December 13, 1974 - January 6, 1975) showed that the Saigon army was not strong enough to counterattack to regain the lost strategic areas and that the US was not capable of re-intervening. This was the basis for the Politburo to strengthen its determination, supplement and complete the plan to liberate the South. On January 8, 1975, the conference assessed: The revolutionary situation was ripe.
A final confrontation between us and the enemy will inevitably take place and the complete collapse of the puppet army and puppet government in the South is inevitable; unanimously approved the seventh draft basic strategic plan prepared by the Central Group and "affirmed the strategic determination to complete the people's national democratic revolution in the South in the two years of 1975 - 1976, determined the tasks, goals and implementation steps" (3). And expected: "if the opportunity comes in early or late 1975, then immediately liberate the South in 1975" (4). When assigning tasks to each battlefield, First Secretary Le Duan expressed his determination "We must try our best to win completely in 1975. That is a realistic possibility" (5).
Implementing the Politburo's determination, the army and people successfully carried out the Central Highlands campaign, creating a turning point and a strategic opportunity for the implementation of the plan to liberate the South, which was the basis for the Politburo to make a strategic determination to liberate the South in 1975 on March 18, 1975.
With the motto of "lightning speed, boldness, surprise, sure victory", the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising continuously achieved important victories, which was the basis for the Politburo to continue to add the strategic determination on April 1, 1975 to "liberate the South as soon as possible, preferably in April 1975, before the rainy season, without delay" (6), with the spirit of "one day is equal to twenty years", our army and people advanced to achieve total victory on April 30, 1975, fully realizing the goal of national reunification, fulfilling the determination of the Politburo.
(1) General Vo Nguyen Giap, Complete Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi 2006, p.1,198.
(2) Communist Party of Vietnam: Complete Party Documents, volume 35, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p. 172.
(3) Communist Party of Vietnam: Complete Party Documents, volume 35, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p.187.
(4) General Vo Nguyen Giap, Complete Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi 2006, p.1,215.
(5) Communist Party of Vietnam: Complete Party Documents, volume 35, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, p.196.
(6) The War Summary Steering Committee under the Politburo, Summary of the Resistance War Against America to Save the Country - Victory and Lessons, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 1995, p.93.
Source: https://nhandan.vn/quyet-tam-giai-phong-mien-nam-post864081.html
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