Unique strategy and military art of the Central Highlands Campaign

Liberation Army entered and captured Hoa Binh airport in Buon Ma Thuot town (1975). (Photo: VNA)

The diversionary operations in the Central Highlands Campaign are considered a unique art in the treasure trove of Vietnamese military art.

Key strategic move

Identifying the Central Highlands Campaign as the key strategic move to open the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, the Party Committee and the Central Highlands Front Command met to discuss the implementation plan and the forces participating in the campaign. The motto and guiding ideology of the Central Highlands Campaign were determined to be "Bold, sure to win, proactive, mobile, flexible, secretive, and surprising."

According to the decision of the Politburo, on February 5, 1975, General Van Tien Dung - Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army was sent to the Central Highlands front to directly monitor and direct the campaign.

The Central Military Commission decided to establish the Central Highlands Front Command, including the following comrades: Commander: Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao; Political Commissar: Colonel Dang Vu Hiep; Deputy Commanders: Major General Vu Lang, Colonels Phan Ham, Nguyen Nang, Nguyen Lang; Deputy Political Commissar: Colonel Phi Trieu Ham.

The Zone 5 Party Committee assigned comrade Bui San - Deputy Secretary of the Zone Party Committee and comrade Nguyen Van Can, Secretary of the Dak Lak Provincial Party Committee, along with a number of cadres representing various sectors to be with the Party Committee and the Campaign Command, to directly command the three provinces of Gia Lai, Kon Tum, and Dak Lak to mobilize all available local capabilities to serve the Central Highlands Campaign.

The representative unit of the Military Commission and the General Command, chaired by General Van Tien Dung, was also located in the Central Highlands to directly command the campaign.

From February 17 to 19, 1975, the Central Highlands Campaign Command held an expanded meeting to discuss in detail each issue of force comparison, battle formation and fighting methods. According to analysis, the situation of the enemy and us on the Central Highlands battlefield was developing in a direction favorable to us. This was a favorable condition for our army to conduct a large-scale joint offensive campaign, winning great victories in the Southern Central Highlands.

The conference decided to concentrate strong forces, mainly on Buon Ma Thuot, Duc Lap, Thuan Man, in which the key target was Buon Ma Thuot. Then, develop the attack to destroy the enemy, liberate Cheo Reo, Gia Nghia and the sub-regions and district capitals in the three provinces of Dak Lak, Phu Bon, Quang Duc; in which, Dak Lak was the key point.

The way to fight the Tay Nguyen Campaign was to secretly deploy forces, cut off routes 19, 14, 21 to block the enemy's rescue forces; attack Duc Lap and Thuan Man to draw the enemy in Buon Ma Thuot out to destroy, making Buon Ma Thuot vulnerable and isolated. Use combined arms forces to attack and destroy the enemy, liberating Buon Ma Thuot.

Soldiers of Pleime group (Gia Lai) discuss plans to fight the enemy. (Photo: Phu Tuan/VNA)

The Campaign Command planned the battle according to two options. The first option was to attack the enemy when they had not yet strengthened their defensive reserves. The second option was when the enemy had strengthened their defensive reserves.

The Campaign Command clearly stated that in preparation work, the second option should be taken as the basis, but in implementation, efforts must be made to create opportunities to attack the enemy according to the first option.

Unique military art

In terms of military art, the Central Highlands Campaign had a very high level of development, most notably the art of deception to deceive the enemy, hiding our main direction of attack, surprising the enemy, losing the initiative to respond, creating a position and maintaining our initiative to attack throughout the campaign. This was a great success of our army.

After the Central Military Commission held a meeting to implement the Politburo's Resolution on the Central Highlands Campaign, the Front Command identified Buon Ma Thuot as the key target. However, if the enemy discovered this intention and increased their forces in Buon Ma Thuot, we would face many difficulties.

With the motto and guiding ideology of "boldness, sure victory, initiative, mobility, flexibility, secrecy, surprise," the preparation for the Central Highlands Campaign took place in extreme secrecy, with an increasingly urgent pace and larger scale.

To keep secret the campaign preparations and the mobilization of forces in different directions on the battlefield, a top secret diversionary plan codenamed "Operation Plan B" was deployed by the Central Highlands Front Command in a unified, tight, and continuous manner on a large scale with the participation of many forces.

Heroic C3 Transport Unit (Tay Nguyen Group 250) carries ammunition to the battlefield. (Photo: Thanh Tung/VNA)

The purpose of this plan is to take advantage of the wear and tear, destroy some of the enemy's forces and means of war at some key points. To pin down, attract, and stretch the enemy's main forces in place, not allowing the enemy to mobilize forces to the Duc Lap, Gia Nghia, and Thuan Man areas; to always make the enemy misunderstand that we are deploying to attack Kon Tum; to cut off the east side of Route 19, threatening Pleiku. This plan creates the most favorable conditions for the Duc Lap, Gia Nghia, and Thuan Man directions to deploy preparations.

The combat plan of the Central Highlands Campaign was to arrange forces, forming a battle formation "Tie up the enemy and destroy them." This was a completely proactive battle formation, attacking the enemy to win for sure, attacking the enemy with position and strength, attacking the enemy with tactics as Senior Lieutenant General, Professor Hoang Minh Thao - Commander of the Central Highlands Front wrote in the book "On the use of troops." That is, the highest strategy is to deceive the enemy, the best strategy is to manipulate the enemy.

To do so, we must first create a campaign space, a division and siege formation, both siege and attack, breakthrough with both strength and strategy, secrecy, surprise to win total victory. Then, use diversionary tactics to distract the enemy, gain the advantage of surprise.

Implementing the Command's combat plan, our troops carried out massive "campaign preparation" work in the Northern Central Highlands. Our diversionary activities were very effective, attracting a large enemy main force towards the Northern Central Highlands, making them confused and passive in response for quite a long time.

Our diversionary activities were very effective, attracting a large enemy main force towards the Northern Central Highlands, making them confused and passive in response for quite a long time.

The enemy judged that we were about to launch a campaign in the Northern Central Highlands, with Kon Tum as the main target, as a major of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam later stated: tactical zone two assessed: in 1975, your attack target will be Kon Tum..., you have not attacked Buon Ma Thuot, because you cannot bring tanks, food, and ammunition there... This was a big mistake of the enemy that we thoroughly exploited.

To thoroughly implement the diversionary plan to deceive the enemy, the Command decided to leave Lieutenant Colonel, Deputy Chief of Staff Hong Son at the rear base in the west of Pleiku to direct the diversionary plan. The 10th and 320th Divisions, when marching into Dak Lak, left the entire radio cluster and the signalmen in their old positions. Every day, the stations still sent out telegrams reporting the situation as usual.

On the other hand, the Campaign Command brought the 968th Division from Southern Laos to the Central Highlands, replacing the 10th Division and the 320th Division. The 968th Division carried out a series of methodical battles in a breakthrough style: before attacking the main target, even large artillery participated, the deployment was as if many divisions were about to attack Pleiku.

On the day we opened fire, the enemy did not know that the 316th Division - the strategic reserve force of the Ministry reinforced for the campaign - had marched from Nghe An straight to Dak Lak. During the entire march, the division did not use radio or reveal its call sign. When arriving at the battlefield, the division was deployed to hide in the old forest west of the Serepok River.

The secret and sudden move of two divisions to the Central Highlands was a brilliant plan by the General Command, directly led by General and Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap. The Central Highlands Campaign Command directly commanded the diversionary combat actions to gain the element of surprise.

Along with the diversionary actions to deceive the enemy, many measures to ensure absolute secrecy were meticulously deployed, such as: banning communication by ultra-short wave radio until the opening fire; engineering units had to build roads day and night, level forests, cut mountains, build bridges..., there were routes for tanks and armored vehicles to attack, our troops had to saw off part of the tree stumps, and wait for the order to have the vehicles ram the trees to create a new road; we also used special forces and portable artillery to attack the enemy during the time the engineers were clearing the road, so that the enemy would not detect the explosion of explosives, the rumbling sound of tanks and artillery when moving.

At that time, the enemy did not know about the mine explosions that our troops had used to launch their attack. Two officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Vu The Quang and Nguyen Trong Luat, later testified that: until then, we still insisted that these were just normal activities of special forces and artillery, and that they would end by morning.

Our plan to deceive and deceive the enemy was kept so secret that even the people thought the army was about to attack Kon Tum.

Our plan to deceive and deceive the enemy was kept so secret that the people thought the troops were about to attack Kon Tum. Even when the Front Command assigned the 968th Division to attack Tam post and Thuan An district..., comrade Thanh Son was surprised and asked: Was the 968th Division really attacking or pretending to attack?

The silent confrontation between us and the enemy lasted throughout the preparation for the Central Highlands Campaign. By the end of February 1975, the enemy still had not discovered our intention to prepare for the campaign. Our diversionary operations against the enemy had been successful. The majority of the enemy's main forces were still deployed in the northern Central Highlands in Kon Tum and Gia Lai.

In Dak Lak and Buon Ma Thuot area, the situation has not changed. The initiative of the campaign is in our hands. We have the conditions and opportunity to attack the enemy in Buon Ma Thuot town according to the plan that the enemy has no reserve defense. At the same time, the forces participating in the Tay Nguyen Campaign have completed the task of assembling in the designated areas. Our troops have prepared all favorable conditions for the opening of the Tay Nguyen Campaign.

Until the opening day of the Central Highlands campaign, the enemy still believed that the 10th Division was in Kon Tum and the 320th Division was in Pleiku. American General Charles Timmet, Military Advisor to Nguyen Van Thieu and Cao Van Vien, also had to admit: by using diversionary tactics through radio waves, the Viet Cong had succeeded in their plan to pin down the main part of the Republic of Vietnam's military forces in Military Region 2 in Pleiku and Kon Tum provinces.

Even close to the day of our attack, when suspicious signs were discovered, such as picking up some items and capturing a soldier of the 320th Division, the enemy sent troops to probe to the North - where the 320th Division was hiding and preparing the battlefield. Wherever the enemy swept, our troops retreated and erased all traces. When they discovered nothing, the enemy was reassured and withdrew about 40 hours before we opened fire. Once again, we defeated the enemy with a diversionary tactic.

From March 5 to 9, 1975, the Campaign Command advocated perseverance, cleverness, and keeping the battle of Buon Ma Thuot secret until the end, fighting the opening battles of Cam Ga and Duc Lap, creating a direct advantage for the decisive key battle in the town.

Implementing that policy, with the assumption that the opportunity to attack the 320th Division by land was not yet available, in order to expand the area and have free hands when attacking Buon Ma Thuot town, we decided to continue destroying the Cam Ga stronghold (Thuan Man district). With Cam Ga and Duc Lap captured, roads 14, 19 and 21 cut off, Buon Ma Thuot town was completely surrounded and isolated.

By fighting fiercely and cleverly, by the end of March 11, 1975, our troops had captured all the most important targets, including: Division 23, sub-region, town airport; controlled Hoa Binh airport, controlled Buon Ma Thuot town..., basically breaking the enemy's position.

Puppet military vehicles were congested on Highway 7 as they fled the Central Highlands. (Photo: VNA)

On March 17, 1975, the key battle to attack Buon Ma Thuot town ended in victory. The enemy troops panicked and fled the Central Highlands, opening the way for the rapid collapse of the Saigon army and government throughout the South.

The victory of the Central Highlands Campaign changed the strategic situation in favor of our army and people to completely liberate the South and unify the country./.

(Vietnam+)

Source: https://www.vietnamplus.vn/chien-luoc-va-nghe-thuat-quan-su-dac-sac-cua-chien-dich-tay-nguyen-post1015596.vnp