The timely, accurate, resolute, and flexible strategic directions of the Politburo, the speed and thoroughness in developing the general offensive plan... contributed to the total victory 48 years ago.
From early recognition of opportunities and two important conferences in 1973
On January 27, 1973, the Paris Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam was signed, leading to a fundamental change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy on the southern battlefield, in a direction that was beneficial to us and unfavorable to the enemy, especially when the US combat troops - the main support of the Saigon government and army - "packed up" and left.
This victory had strategic significance, creating a new situation, as recognized by Major General Nguyen Hong Quan, former Deputy Director of the Institute of Defense Strategy, Ministry of National Defense, the Paris Agreement was a prerequisite for us to decide to quickly liberate the South and unify the country.
According to Major General Nguyen Hong Quan, the Party's strategic initiative in directing the people's war of liberation was clearly demonstrated in the preparation phase for the General Offensive and Uprising to liberate the South and unify the country. In the first few months after signing the Paris Agreement (January 27, 1973), we quickly changed our strategic position on all battlefields in the South. In particular, the preparation of revolutionary armed forces and the formation of main army corps clearly demonstrated our strategic initiative.
People of Saigon city held a rally to welcome the launch of the City Military Management Committee, May 7, 1975. Photo: Minh Loc/VNA
To set out policies and directions for the Southern revolution, on April 19, 1973, key leaders in the Southern battlefields were summoned to Hanoi to directly report on the situation and prepare content for the Politburo conference.
On May 24, 1973, the Politburo held an expanded conference with the participation of a number of comrades who directly led and commanded on the battlefields. After studying and discussing, the Conference unanimously determined that the basic task of the Southern revolution in the period after the Paris Agreement was to continue the people's national democratic revolution.
The conference determined: Unite the entire people, fight on three political, military and diplomatic fronts; resolutely defeat the enemy's plots and actions to sabotage the Paris Agreement; maintain and develop revolutionary forces in all aspects, prepare the most adequate conditions to be able to proactively deal with the enemy in all situations, and be ready to lead the Southern revolution forward to complete victory.
The 21st Central Conference (term III) held in two sessions (session I from June 19 to July 6, 1973, session II from October 1 to October 4, 1973) provided direction for the formation of a strategy to liberate the South. The conference affirmed: “The revolutionary path of the South is the path of revolutionary violence. Regardless of the situation, we must firmly grasp the opportunity, maintain the strategic offensive line, provide flexible direction, and move the revolution in the South forward.”
To the strategic plan to liberate the South: 8 revisions, completed at lightning speed in nearly 2 months
In March 1974, to concretize Central Resolution 21 on the military aspect, the Central Military Commission Conference proposed a policy of resolutely counterattacking and attacking the enemy, flexibly applying the motto and methods of fighting in all three strategic regions.
On July 21, 1974, an important conference took place in Do Son (Hai Phong), chaired by First Secretary Le Duan, with the participation of representatives of the Central Military Commission and the Operations Department (General Staff). The conference assessed: “The most favorable opportunity for our people to complete the liberation of the South has appeared... If we delay for another ten or fifteen years, the invading forces will recover, the situation will be extremely complicated... This opportunity requires us to act quickly, neatly, thoroughly, but we must be clever, only then can we create surprise, making the enemy and other hostile forces unable to react in time” .
Back to the milestone of 1973. In fact, the day after the victory of the Paris Agreement, with the early and accurate identification of the opportunity, we had the first ideas about a plan to liberate the South. Specifically, from April 1973, following the instructions of comrade Le Duan, the General Staff built a strategic plan to liberate the South.
At the same time, the Central Military Commission ordered the formation of a Central Group within the General Staff with the task of preparing this plan. All members of the group were experienced commanders. Major General, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Le Trong Tan was the Group Leader. The Group included the Director of the Vu Lang Operations Department and two Deputy Directors, Vo Quang Ho and Le Huu Duc.
Ho Chi Minh Campaign Command at Ta Thiet - Loc Ninh base (April 1975). Photo: VNA
As the strategic plan to liberate the South was expected to take two years, the planning process was extremely meticulous. However, to ensure that the opportunity was not missed, urgency and speed were among the number one requirements.
According to the memoirs of Lieutenant General Le Huu Duc, former Director of the Operations Department, one of the four people involved in drafting the plan to liberate the South, on June 5, 1973, the first draft was clearly stated: “The direction of the battlefield, the main direction of the main attacks: 1- The main attack direction is the South. 2- The main direction of our main force is: the Central Highlands, the Southeast. Mainly the Central Highlands, because of the good terrain, ensuring the development of technical weapons, combining the main attack with the uprising attack of the plains of Military Region V; ensuring continuous attacks, having conditions to ensure material facilities, the enemy is currently relatively weak” . This preparation work is top secret and is within the scope of the General Staff.
According to many documents, from early June to mid-August 1973, the strategic plan was drafted three times, each time receiving comments from the Politburo and the Central Military Commission for additions and revisions. Each time it was drafted and revised, new issues arose that needed further discussion and debate.
In the third draft, the Central Group analyzed in depth the characteristics of the general uprising, predicted the opportunity for the general uprising to take place, and strategic measures to promote the combined strength to carry out the general uprising and general offensive, taking mass mobilization as the most important step, with Saigon as the number one focus. The general offensive and general uprising became a prominent issue that was discussed a lot during the times the Politburo approved the strategic plan.
Also according to Lieutenant General Le Huu Duc, on July 20, 1974, comrade Le Duan had another private meeting with Senior Lieutenant General Hoang Van Thai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Major General Le Trong Tan, Deputy Chief of the General Staff in Do Son, Hai Phong. The plan was drafted for the fifth time.
At this meeting, comrade Le Trong Tan reported in detail on the situation of our troops and the enemy troops on the battlefields. After listening, comrade Le Duan said: "Today I invite you here to discuss a big matter: We must liberate the South immediately after the US withdraws..." And he gave many precise and guiding opinions to the General Staff's plan.
Finally, he said: “I agree with the opinion of the General Staff that the Politburo must have a resolution on the new situation, unify actions, unify will to mobilize the strength of the whole country for this great cause” . After that working session, the Central Group drafted the 6th “General Offensive and General Offensive Plan” on August 15, 1974.
This plan was revised 8 times, by the end of 1973, basically unifying the plan to liberate the South in 2 years (expected 1975 - 1976). According to Lieutenant General Le Huu Duc, the 8th draft was presented to the expanded Politburo meeting from December 18, 1974 to January 8, 1975, with the participation of comrades in charge of the battlefields.
This draft proposed three options. Option I: General strategic offensive. The main direction is the Central Highlands. The main direction of attack and uprising is the East and Saigon. Option II: General offensive and uprising in parallel. Concentrating forces on two key areas: Saigon - the East and Tri Thien - Da Nang.
Option III: General uprising combined with general offensive. This conference chose option I and at the same time made an extremely wise decision, demonstrating and elevating military art to a new level: “If we can create an opportunity in early 1975, we will immediately liberate the South in 1975.”
The Politburo and Strategic Directions Before G-hour
Entering the second half of 1974, the war situation had a strong change in a direction increasingly favorable to the revolution. In that situation, the Politburo held a Conference from September 3 to October 7, 1974 to discuss the plan to completely liberate the South. At this Conference, the Politburo met and basically agreed with the content of the draft Strategic Plan prepared by the Operations Department.
The Politburo affirmed: This is the most favorable opportunity for our people to completely liberate the South and achieve complete victory. Twenty years of fighting by the people of the whole country have created this opportunity. Apart from this opportunity, there is no other opportunity. If we wait another ten or fifteen years, the enemy will recover, the invading forces will expand and become stronger, the situation will be extremely complicated.
In terms of time, the Politburo basically agreed on the project to build a strategic plan to liberate the South in the two years of 1975 - 1976. All preparations must be carried out urgently, creating the most complete material foundation to strike hard, strike quickly, win cleanly and win completely. The conference agreed to take the Central Highlands as the main direction of attack in 1975.
On the morning of May 13, 1975, the leaders of the Central Bureau and the army and people of the South went to Tan Son Nhat airport to welcome President Ton Duc Thang, who led the delegation of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Vietnam Fatherland Front to attend the Victory Celebration in Saigon. In the photo: Comrade Pham Hung, Politburo member and Secretary of the Southern Party Committee, welcomed President Ton Duc Thang at Tan Son Nhat airport. Photo: Van Bao/VNA.
More than two months later, after monitoring the relevant international and regional situation, and at the same time grasping specific developments from the battlefield, and having more practical basis, the Party convened an expanded Politburo Conference (meeting from December 18, 1974 to January 8, 1975), in which many leaders and comrades in charge of battlefields from the South attended, continuing to supplement and complete the strategic determination to completely liberate the South.
The meeting was about to end when the revolutionary armed forces liberated Phuoc Long town and the entire Phuoc Long province (January 6, 1975). The Politburo analyzed and compared the forces on the battlefield, asserting that "the enemy's situation was getting worse and worse, the enemy's strength was getting weaker and weaker" , and decided to "urgently prepare all aspects to successfully end the war of national salvation in 1975 or 1976" , and clearly stated that "we must make every effort to win completely in 1975. That is a realistic possibility" .
Thus, in a very short time, the Politburo continuously added strategic determination, deciding to shorten the time: completely liberate the South in 1975 (meeting on March 18, 1975), completely liberate the South before the rainy season in 1975 (meeting on March 25, 1975), completely liberate the South as soon as possible, preferably in April 1975 (meeting on April 1, 1975).
The final strategic battle, the moment of total victory, the country is filled with joy
Implementing the strategic determination of the Politburo, the whole country made great efforts to prepare for the final strategic battle. Before that, implementing the plan to liberate the South of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission, the South and the North urgently completed all preparations, both in terms of position and strength. The North sent 110,000 cadres and soldiers, and transported more than 400,000 tons of materials to the South.
The main army corps were also established, including the 1st Army Corps established on October 24, 1973, the 2nd Army Corps established on May 17, 1974, the 4th Army Corps established on July 20, 1974, the 3rd Army Corps established on March 26, 1975, and the 232nd Army Corps (Southwest Wing Army Corps) established in February 1975. Our army and people also built a road network, a petroleum pipeline system, and a communication system connecting the North to the South.
Implementing the Party's strategic determination, the Central Highlands battlefield was chosen as the main attack direction of the 1975 Spring Strategic General Offensive, with the key opening battle being the capture of Buon Ma Thuot town. After less than two days of fighting, at 10:30 a.m. on March 11, 1975, our army completely liberated Buon Ma Thuot town.
The victory of Buon Ma Thuot was a preemptive strike that hit the enemy's vital points, causing the entire enemy's strategic defense system in the Central Highlands to be severely shaken. Faced with the great victory in the Central Highlands, in the meeting on March 18, 1975, the Politburo promptly added a strategic determination: Liberate the South in 1975.
The Politburo directed two strategic attacks on the battlefields of Hue - Da Nang and Saigon - Gia Dinh. From March 6, 1975, our army began to attack in Tri Thien and Zone 5. On March 25, 1975, the Politburo added the determination to liberate the South before the rainy season of 1975. On March 26, 1975, Hue was liberated. On March 29, 1975, Da Nang was liberated.
By April 3, 1975, all the coastal provinces of the Central region were liberated. On April 4, 1975, the Central Military Commission assigned Zone 5 and the Navy to attack and liberate the islands of the Truong Sa archipelago; from April 14 to 29, 1975, all the islands were liberated.
Based on the extremely rapid changes on the battlefield, after those resounding victories, on March 31, 1975, the Politburo held an expanded meeting to discuss the third strategic attack to liberate Saigon, making a historic decision: "Seize the strategic opportunity, be determined to carry out a general offensive and uprising, and successfully end the liberation war in the shortest time. It is best to start and end in April this year, without delay" . The 5-month plan was further reduced to 4 months. The Politburo also proposed the guiding motto: "speed, boldness, surprise, sure victory" .
On April 7, 1975, General Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap gave the order: “Fast, faster. Bold, bolder. Seize every hour, every minute, rush to the front, liberate the South.”
On April 14, 1975, the Politburo approved the plan to liberate Saigon, named the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, and decided: "Agree to name the Saigon Campaign the Ho Chi Minh Campaign" . Saigon - Gia Dinh is the main strategic attack direction and also our final strategic goal. This is considered a strategic decisive campaign with the form of large-scale coordinated attacks between military services and arms to quickly end the war.
On April 26, 1975, our army began the Ho Chi Minh Campaign with an overwhelming force, three times the size of the puppet army in Saigon, advancing according to the plan of "liberating and occupying the entire city, disarming the enemy army, dissolving the enemy's government at all levels, and completely crushing all their resistance" .
Earlier that day, the Politburo held a meeting to request all preparations from the Supreme Commander to the Command and units in the key battlefield. Five important targets were identified by the Ho Chi Minh Campaign Command: Tan Son Nhat Airport, the puppet General Staff, the puppet Presidential Palace, the Capital Special Zone and the General Police Department.
On the evening of April 29 and the morning of April 30, with the necessary overwhelming force, including 5 army corps, modern technical weapons simultaneously attacked the center of Saigon, we quickly occupied the main targets, controlling the city. At 11:30 a.m. on April 30, 1975, President Duong Van Minh was forced to declare unconditional surrender. Saigon was liberated, the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign was a complete victory. "The revolution kept Saigon almost intact. It was a great success that the whole world was amazed by" - the world press constantly praised and admired.
The strategic determination for the final day of victory has yielded sweet fruit, the country and mountains are unified and joined together.
Ha Anh
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