50th Anniversary of Southern Liberation and National Reunification: Central Highlands Campaign - Strategic Breakthrough

At the expanded conference from December 18, 1974 to January 8, 1975, the Politburo approved the Strategic Plan to liberate the South in the two years 1975-1976, and at the same time, prepared the Opportunity Plan to liberate the South in 1975. The Politburo decided to launch the Central Highlands Campaign - "Strategic Breakthrough", taking the Central Highlands as the main direction of attack and the key target being Buon Ma Thuot town - the important "Acupressure Battle".

1. Realizing the strategic determination of the Politburo

Under the direction of the Politburo, the Central Military Commission directed the General Staff, directly the Central Group, to develop a Strategic Plan, research, and carefully consider. In the years 1973-1975, among the four enemy military regions and corps, the area of ​​Military Region 2-Corps 2 had two areas: the Central Highlands with five provinces and the central plain area along the coast with seven provinces. This was a weak battlefield, with many loopholes of the enemy, but very dangerous. If the Central Highlands, the “roof of southern Indochina”, were lost, the enemy’s strategic position in the south would be cut in half.

Our troops captured Buon Ma Thuot airport in the Central Highlands Campaign - Opening the 1975 Spring General Offensive. Photo: Archive

As comrade Truong Chinh commented: “Whoever occupies the Central Highlands will control Vietnam and Indochina”. From here, our army can send troops to Laos, Cambodia, to northern Vietnam and then land on a strip of the central coast, or advance to the Southern region. By occupying the Central Highlands, our army will have the conditions to send large technical weapons to occupy the central plains, carrying out an extremely important strategic division - “The decisive strategic division spearhead”.

The Central Highlands has mountainous terrain, many passes, many dangerous and hidden slopes, which limits the enemy's modern equipment. This terrain effectively brings into play our large technical weapons. The 559 strategic transportation system has passed through the Central Highlands, ensuring logistics and technology for our army to fight for a long time.

2. The Central Highlands campaign continuously surprised and stunned the army and the puppet government of Saigon.

When our army attacked the Central Highlands, the enemy had to come to our rescue. But the enemy could not send in massive reinforcements when our army had cut off the main roads: 19, 21 and 14. The enemy could only land troops by air, but this way it would take two to three days to land a regiment or brigade with full equipment. On the other hand, the enemy could not send in heavy equipment such as tanks and 155mm or larger artillery by air.

Based on choosing the right main attack direction, our army continued to choose Buon Ma Thuot as the main target of the General Offensive. This place is located deep in the enemy's controlled area, is an important economic, political and cultural center of the Central Highlands, the town has a very mobile position, standing right at the strategic intersection of Route 21 connecting Nha Trang and Route 14, the north goes to Cheo Reo - Pleiku, the south goes to Gia Nghia in the Southeast; is the place where the leading reactionary forces in the region are concentrated. This is where the enemy is weak and vulnerable.

When attacking Buon Ma Thuot, our army encountered difficulties in reconnaissance, understanding the enemy, understanding the terrain, transporting logistics and mobilizing and deploying forces. All preparations had to be very elaborate and absolutely secret, combined with diversionary activities, attracting the enemy's attention and countering in other directions to eliminate the possibility of the enemy increasing its reserves. The plan to attack Buon Ma Thuot had to be proactive and creative, ensuring that victory was certain in all situations.

Not only did the Central Military Commission's Strategic Planning Center discover and choose Buon Ma Thuot to launch the General Offensive and Uprising. When the Central Military Commission suggested: If in 1975 our army launched a major attack on the Central Highlands battlefield, what should the main target be? The Standing Committee and the B3 Command answered: We should choose to attack Buon Ma Thuot.

At the same time, with the permission of the Ministry of National Defense, Major General Le Trong Tan - Deputy Chief of the General Staff - directly directed the campaign for military students, giving the assignment of a large-scale attack in the Central Highlands to the Senior Cadre Class of the Senior Cadre Academy (now the National Defense Academy). Most of the students chose to attack Buon Ma Thuot. Thus, the intention to attack Buon Ma Thuot had achieved high consensus, being a meeting of the strategic level and the campaign level as well as the battlefield.

The developments of the Central Highlands Campaign proved that the determination to choose Buon Ma Thuot town as the key battle, the opening battle, was very correct.

a dangerous attack aimed at the enemy's weak points. The liberation of Buon Ma Thuot town broke the defensive line of the puppet army in the Central Highlands. The enemy fell into a state of panic and made strategic mistakes. Seizing the opportunity when the enemy fled, our army organized a pursuit, expanding the liberated area while causing heavy losses, causing the enemy soldiers to panic and collapse. Our army's liberation of the Central Highlands provinces and the central coastal provinces caused the enemy to be divided, their strategic arrangement was disrupted, and the enemy's defensive system on the southern battlefield was shaken, promoting mass disintegration.

3. The great strategic victory of the Central Highlands Campaign

With the victory in the Central Highlands, for the first time in 30 years of revolutionary war, through an offensive campaign, our army forced the enemy army, which was equipped with modern equipment, to withdraw from a strategic area. The 2nd Corps of the 2nd puppet Military Region was wiped out, five Central Highlands provinces: Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Phu Bon and Quang Duc, and three South Central provinces: Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa were liberated.

The Central Highlands Campaign successfully completed its mission of destroying a large part of the enemy's forces, liberating strategically important areas, and breaking and cutting the enemy's strategic deployment in half. The enemy had to huddle together and passively respond on the battlefields, falling into a passive and confused position, negatively affecting the soldiers' morale. The victory created a chain reaction - the "domino effect", promoting the enemy's disintegration. The victory of the Central Highlands Campaign created momentum and strength for the revolution "like a rising tide, a falling waterfall", "like a young child", creating an opportunity for "one day to equal twenty years".

The strategic offensive in the Central Highlands opened up a general strategic offensive on the entire southern battlefield. This victory created a decisive turning point, collapsing the enemy's defensive position, opening up favorable opportunities for our army and people to continue strategic attacks, moving towards completely liberating the south and unifying the country.

After winning the victory in the Central Highlands, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission met and decided to switch to an opportunistic plan, changing the strategic offensive to a general strategic offensive, completing the two-year plan in 1975. The Central Highlands Campaign was truly a strategic breakthrough that opened the way for the victory of the great Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising.

Colonel, Associate Professor, Dr. NGUYEN VAN SAU

(According to NDO)

Source: https://baobinhdinh.vn/viewer.aspx?macm=1&macmp=1&mabb=343153