On October 27, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced the start of a ground operation in the Gaza Strip to completely eliminate Hamas forces in this territory. However, after nearly three weeks of fighting, Tel Aviv has only temporarily divided the southern and northern parts of Gaza, while controlling a small area along the Mediterranean coast.
As the conflict escalates, Israel’s losses are increasing day by day. According to the IDF, more than 30 Israeli soldiers have been killed in the fighting in Gaza, along with many heavy weapons destroyed.
Despite the possibility of higher casualties as Israeli ground units advance deeper into the Gaza Strip, the IDF will continue its ground campaign until it achieves its goal of isolating Gaza City and the northern part of the strip.
As of early November, Israel had deployed at least 20,000 troops to the Gaza Strip, but fighting was mainly in the north. (Photo: AP)
Take it one step at a time
According to Foreign Policy , the IDF's strategy of encircling and isolating the northern Gaza Strip and Gaza City in stages is believed to be influenced by the US. Washington wants Tel Aviv to minimize civilian casualties as the number of Palestinians killed has surpassed 10,000.
The strategy of encirclement and attrition was applied quite successfully by the US military in the first and second attacks on the city of Fallujah (Iraq) in 2004. Accordingly, Israel's fighting style will revolve around gaining control of each small area.
From the safe zone, IDF forces would attack Hamas positions, then retreat to safe areas to request air support. The next step would be to advance to control the battlefield, a process that would be repeated until the enemy was eliminated.
If successful, this process would help Israel gain more and more territory from Hamas, while preventing Hamas from regrouping and deploying weapons to its defensive positions.
Senior IDF officials told Foreign Policy that the current strategy would isolate, encircle, and eliminate Hamas commanders, but it would be a slow process that would take months. However, it would pose little risk to Palestinian soldiers and civilians.
Besides the fighting on the ground, the Israeli army also has to pay attention to the underground war, where Hamas has a tunnel system up to 400km long, spreading throughout the Gaza Strip.
"Almost all of Hamas' military capabilities are underground. Most of them cannot be attacked by airstrikes," John Spencer, chairman of the urban warfare research group at the Madison Policy Forum in New York, told Time magazine.
Key Israeli military equipment such as night vision goggles, satellite communications and GPS systems are useless in these tunnels, so Tel Aviv would want to avoid sending troops into Hamas tunnels.
However, the Israeli military will still attempt to destroy the tunnels whenever possible. The IDF will do this by filling them with cement, leveling the entrances, or flooding them with seawater.
In addition, the IDF's specialized engineering unit Yahalom will also conduct sweeps in the tunnels for exploration purposes.
In a statement on November 8, the IDF claimed to have destroyed 130 Hamas tunnels since the conflict began.
Intelligence data from one raid informs the next. One raid after another eventually leads the Israelis to the location of Hamas headquarters and leadership.
Map of fighting in Gaza as of November 7. Purple indicates Israeli offensives, red areas indicate airstrikes. (Photo: BBC)
Potential risks
Although Israeli soldiers are trained in both urban and underground warfare, using large infantry forces to enter a city or tunnel would put them and the hostages held there at a disadvantage.
To prevent Hamas from maintaining its tunnel systems, Israel cut off fuel supplies to Gaza before launching its ground offensive. This action left Hamas’ tunnel system partially reduced but still usable.
However, Israel has not yet had a solid solution to prevent Hamas from moving between the north and south through the tunnel system, despite controlling the Salah al-Din highway - the main road connecting the two areas.
IDF leaders understand that fighting in densely populated urban areas and venturing underground would deprive the Israeli military of most of its technological advantages, including advanced surveillance systems, sensors, and communications equipment. That would give Hamas the advantage both above and below ground.
On the contrary, Hamas forces have shown careful preparation and confidence in the face of the enemy's invasion of this land.
"We were prepared for an Israeli ground offensive even before we attacked. We had many surprises for the enemy. For us, an urban war is easier than an air war," Ali Barakeh , a senior Hamas political leader, told the Financial Times .
From the above statement, Hamas clearly revealed its intention to use urban warfare to overcome Israel's technological superiority and air control.
The tunnel system, which stretches over 400km, will be a “weapon” to help Hamas fight Israel for a long time. (Photo: Financial Times)
Hamas can do this by forcing the fighting into narrow streets, where the greatest advantage lies in the defenders’ preparation. With a small area but a population of more than 2.3 million, Gaza is not short of such locations.
The Financial Times predicts that the tactic Hamas will use is ground raids, rapid attacks, using camouflaged bombs to wear down Israeli forces and then withdraw to the tunnel system.
Thanks to the tunnels, Hamas can appear and disappear, suddenly attack Israeli troops from unpredictable locations and then easily escape.
In addition, by holding all 240 hostages underground, Hamas is making the IDF hesitate in making decisions to destroy the tunnel network.
This makes Israel's goal of completely destroying Hamas particularly difficult. In the event of a fatal defeat, Hamas can still escape through the tunnels and rebuild its forces.
Hamas’s plans will be carried out by a force of about 40,000 fighters who are basically trained and proficient in traditional guerrilla tactics. This army is equipped with much more advanced weapons than the war with Israel in 2014, including drones, machine guns, AK-103 assault rifles, and surface-to-air missiles provided by allies.
In particular, Hamas also has the service of a series of weapons factories scattered throughout Gaza. These factories are self-sufficient in producing a variety of rockets, with a range of up to 250km.
According to the Israeli Finance Ministry, the conflict in Gaza could cost Tel Aviv up to $51 billion. (Photo: New York Times)
Another major problem for Israel besides Hamas tunnels is funding its military campaign in the Gaza Strip. Israel’s Finance Ministry said on November 8 that the country’s budget deficit for the year ending October 2023 had increased to 47.2 billion shekels ($12.28 billion), or 2.6% of its gross domestic product (GDP). This deficit is largely due to the current conflict.
The deficit trend over the past year is in stark contrast to the 8 billion shekel budget surplus recorded in the period from November 2021 to October 2022.
In October 2023 alone, Israel's monthly budget expenditures amounted to 54.9 billion shekels ($14.3 billion), up 32.3% year-on-year, while revenues fell 16.4% to 32 billion shekels ($8.3 billion). The deficit was recorded at 22.9 billion shekels ($5.9 billion), more than seven times higher than in October last year.
According to the Israeli Finance Ministry, budget spending increased due to increased defense spending along with prepayments to suppliers, local governments and individuals to support the Israeli economy during the conflict.
In addition, tax revenue has decreased, partly because the government has allowed tax deferrals to ease the financial burden on businesses and households during the current difficult period.
According to Calcalist - Israel's leading financial newspaper, citing a preliminary estimate from the country's Ministry of Finance, the conflict in Gaza could cost Tel Aviv up to 200 billion shekels (about 51 billion USD).
According to Calcalist, the above cost is equivalent to 10% of Israel's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), calculated based on the assumption that the conflict lasts from 8 to 12 months, is limited to Gaza, has no outside involvement and about 350,000 Israeli reserve soldiers will soon return to work.
Faced with the above situation, international credit rating agency S&P has lowered Israel's economic outlook from "stable" to "negative," while Moody's and Fitch are also considering possibly downgrading the rating of this Middle Eastern country.
Tra Khanh (Synthesis)
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