Xuan Loc-Long Khanh Campaign changes the way of fighting

On April 13, 1975, the Saigon-Gia Dinh Campaign Command proposed to the Politburo that the campaign to liberate Saigon be named the Ho Chi Minh Campaign. The General Command sent a telegram to the Xuan Loc-Long Khanh Campaign Command to change the fighting method.

The Liberation Army occupied the Armored School of the puppet army at the Nuoc Trong base (Bien Hoa). From the beginning of April 1975, our main army corps advanced from all directions towards Saigon, attacked the enemy with stormy force and destroyed the entire outer defense line of the enemy. (Photo: Hua Kiem/VNA)

At noon on April 13, 1975, the General Command sent a telegram to the Xuan Loc-Long Khanh Campaign Command: In the Xuan Loc direction, there should be no additional forces. With the available forces, change the fighting method appropriately to meet the requirements set forth.

On April 13, 1975, Senior Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra, Commander of the Liberation Army of South Vietnam, came to the Xuan Loc-Long Khanh Campaign Command Headquarters to direct a change in the fighting method: not focusing forces on attacking the inner city but switching to encircling, isolating, and cutting off Xuan Loc from the traffic corridors connecting to Bien Hoa, to Binh Thuan, to Da Lat and down to Ba Ria-Vung Tau. The Liberation Army only kept a part to restrain the enemy in the town, adjusted its forces, organized an attack to capture Dau Giay intersection, cut off Highway 1, blocked enemy forces from Trang Bom up, from Gia Kiem down, controlled Tan Phong sub-region, cut off Highway 2 to Ba Ria.

On the same day, the Saigon-Gia Dinh Liberation Campaign Command proposed to the Politburo to name this campaign the Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

The Saigon-Gia Dinh City Party Committee focused on directing preparations for the mass uprising and developing its strength. Party cadres and mass bases were reinforced at all levels. The City Commandos firmly controlled important forces such as the commando team and armed masses to be ready to launch a mass uprising.

In addition, the forces stationed in the suburbs were also ordered to be ready to enter the inner city. In addition, the logistics forces to ensure the campaign were also deployed. The best support groups for their directions were: 210, 814, 235, 220, 230, 240. The logistics directions closely coordinated with the logistics bases in the suburbs and inner city to form teams to receive support from the Central, building a widespread, interconnected supply formation.

In Military Region 8, on April 13, 1975, two regiments 24 and 88 and two battalions of Long An province opened fire on the enemy in Tan Tru.

In Military Region 9, from April 13 to 20, 1975, the forces of the Military Region fought in small groups, destroying 2 companies of the 31st Regiment and 3 M113 vehicles on National Highway 4 and the surrounding areas, while actively preparing to capture and cut off this road, surround and shell Tra Noc airport, and prepare to capture the two towns of Vinh Long and Tra Vinh.

NDO

Source: https://baohanam.com.vn/chinh-tri/ngay-13-4-1975-chien-dich-xuan-loc-long-khanh-chuyen-cach-danh-156077.html