Victory News April 13, 1975: Changing the way of fighting in Xuan Loc battle

By April 13, 1975, our troops had advanced and prepared to attack the Phan Rang "steel shield", the enemy's "death-defending" line from afar in Saigon.

At noon of the same day, the General Command sent a telegram to the Xuan Loc - Long Khanh Campaign Command, instructing: In the direction of Xuan Loc, there should be no additional forces. With the available forces, change the fighting method appropriately to meet the set requirements.

Senior Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra, Deputy Commander of the Campaign Command, went to the Command Center with the Commander of the 4th Corps to study the developments of the battle and decided to reorganize the forces and change the way of fighting the Xuan Loc Campaign.

Based on the basic assumption that for the entire Saigon defense line of the enemy, Xuan Loc was only valuable when connected to Bien Hoa, the Campaign Command and the 4th Corps advocated establishing a new battle formation, isolating and cutting Xuan Loc off from Bien Hoa by capturing the Dau Day intersection, cutting off Route 1, blocking enemy troops from Bien Hoa, Trang Bom from counterattacking and capturing Tan Phong, cutting off Route 2 to Ba Ria.

The decision to change the way of fighting opened up a new direction of development on the Xuan Loc front, reflecting the sensitivity, closeness to reality and decisiveness of the Command in the process of conducting the campaign.

Liberation Army cannons fire at Bien Hoa airport. (Photo: VNA)

On April 13, 1975, the Saigon - Gia Dinh Liberation Campaign Command unanimously proposed to the Politburo that the Saigon liberation campaign be named the Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

The Saigon-Gia Dinh Party Committee focused on directing preparations for the uprising to mobilize the masses, distributing leaflets to develop their strength. All levels were reinforced with cadres, party members and mass bases. The city commandos firmly controlled important forces, such as 60 commando teams and more than 300 armed masses, to be ready to mobilize the masses to rise up.

In addition, the forces standing in the suburbs were also ordered to be ready to enter the inner city, and the logistics forces to ensure the campaign were also deployed. The best support groups for their directions were: 210, 814, 235, 220, 230, 240. The logistics directions closely coordinated with the logistics bases in the suburbs and inner city to form teams to receive support from the Central, building a widespread, interconnected supply formation.

In Military Region 8, on April 13, 1975, two regiments 24 and 88 and two battalions of Long An province opened fire on the enemy in Tan Tru.

In Military Region 9, from April 13 to 20, 1975, the forces of the Military Region fought in small groups, destroying 2 companies of the 31st Regiment and 3 M113 vehicles on National Highway 4 and the surrounding areas, while actively preparing to capture and cut off this road, surround and shell Tra Noc airport, and prepare to capture the two towns of Vinh Long and Tra Vinh.

Also on April 13, 1975, General Vo Nguyen Giap sent a telegram to comrade Hai Manh and the Regional Party Committee of Zone 5, emphasizing the opportunity to capture the offshore islands: If the enemy has withdrawn all or most of its forces, then immediately capture the islands.

Libra - Vtcnews.vn

Source: https://vtcnews.vn/ban-tin-chien-thang-13-4-1975-doi-cach-danh-tran-xuan-loc-ar937325.html