The art of dispersing the enemy on the Dien Bien Phu battlefield

(Dan Tri) - The victory of the Dien Bien Phu campaign marked the military art in the resistance war against France, including the art of dispersing the enemy on the battlefields, according to Major General Nguyen Hong Quan.

"The strategic idea of ​​attack and the art of dispersing the enemy on the battlefields in the Dien Bien Phu campaign" is the main content of the speech of Major General, Professor, Dr. Nguyen Hong Quan (former Deputy Director of the Institute of Defense Strategy). The speech was sent by him to the seminar "Military art in the Dien Bien Phu campaign - Practical lessons in current combat training", organized by the 12th Corps Command in coordination with the People's Army Newspaper in early April. The most difficult decision in the military career of General Vo Nguyen Giap According to Major General Nguyen Hong Quan, the French built Dien Bien Phu into the strongest military stronghold group in Indochina, an "invincible fortress" in terms of forces, weapons, equipment, ground and air combat vehicles, fortification systems, bunkers..., aiming to "crush" the main force of the Viet Minh. Therefore, to win, our army needed to destroy the Dien Bien Phu stronghold, disintegrating the colonialists' and imperialists' hope of continuing the war.

Major General Nguyen Hong Quan - former Deputy Director of the Institute of Defense Strategy (Photo: Tien Tuan).

In September 1953, the Politburo headed by President Ho Chi Minh met to discuss the military mission of the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954. President Ho Chi Minh emphasized at that time: "The enemy concentrates a large military force to create strength. If we force them to disperse their forces, that strength will no longer exist...". Two months later, following the direction of the Politburo and the General Military Commission, the General Command, our troops advanced to the Northwest. Along with the main direction of the Northwest, our troops also attacked Central Laos, Lower Laos, Northern Central Highlands, and Upper Laos. Therefore, the French army was forced to disperse its forces to hold the Northwest, Upper Laos, Lower Laos, Northern Central Highlands, and the Northern Delta. On December 6, 1953, the Politburo decided to launch the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. President Ho Chi Minh stated: "This campaign is a very important campaign, we must concentrate on completing it successfully". At the end of 1953, after inspecting Na San and analyzing and evaluating the enemy situation in Dien Bien Phu, General Vo Nguyen Giap and the Chinese military advisory group considered and proposed two options: a quick attack and a sure attack for analysis. Through discussion, the Head and Deputy Head of the Chinese expert group, Vi Quoc Thanh and Mai Gia Sinh, both chose the option of "quick attack, quick victory", using a deep thrust to "create disorder in the enemy's defense center right from the start, then attack from the inside out, attack from the outside in, and destroy the enemy in a relatively short time", deciding to open fire at 5:00 p.m. on January 25, 1954. Everyone was preparing quickly for the Dien Bien Phu campaign. However, near January 25, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap decided to postpone the opening fire for 24 hours while the units were ready and waiting for orders. The General decided to convene a meeting of the Front Party Committee to present his thoughts on a new combat plan that was consistent with the comparison of the balance of forces between us and the enemy. At the conference on January 26, 1954, with the responsibility of Commander and Secretary of the Campaign Party Committee, General Vo Nguyen Giap made the most difficult decision in his military career when, together with the Campaign Party Committee, he decided to change the campaign motto from "fight fast, win fast" to "fight steadily, advance steadily". This was a "historic decision" with a scientific basis, because the comparison of the balance of forces between us and the enemy had changed.

On December 6, 1953, the Politburo held a meeting chaired by President Ho Chi Minh to listen to the General Military Commission's report and final approval of the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign plan, and at the same time decided to launch the Dien Bien Phu Campaign with the determination to destroy this stronghold group at all costs (Photo: VNA).

At this time, the French army was no longer in a temporary state of defense but had become a "solid defensive stronghold group", an "impregnable" fortress, equipped with modern weapons. Meanwhile, despite receiving help from China and the Soviet Union in weapons and ammunition, our army still had many limitations, and could not be compared with tanks, aircraft, artillery, and the professional army of France. Considering the lives of each soldier on the battlefield, General Vo Nguyen Giap concluded that it was impossible to risk devoting all his strength to "fight quickly, win quickly". The art of dispersing the enemy on the battlefields Major General Nguyen Hong Quan commented that the glorious victory of the Dien Bien Phu campaign marked the peak of the development of Vietnamese military art in the resistance war against France, including the art of dispersing the enemy on the battlefields. According to the 1954 Spring combat plan approved by the Politburo, from December 10 to 25, 1953, our army attacked enemy forces in Lai Chau, annihilating 20 enemy companies, creating a strong threat to Dien Bien Phu. At the end of December 1953, our army coordinated with the Pathet Lao army to destroy the "forbidden line" of the French army at the 18th parallel, liberating many areas of Central Laos.

General Vo Nguyen Giap visits the Dien Bien Phu battlefield (Photo: Archive).

In early February 1954, our army attacked the enemy in Kon Tum and the northern Central Highlands, initially defeating the French army's Atlant operation; completely defeating the plot to pacify the free zone of Nam - Ngai - Binh - Phu, contributing to "sharing the fire" with the Dien Bien Phu battlefield. The strategic attacks along with the activities of our army and people in the enemy's rear caused the French mobile forces to be dispersed in many directions, forcing the French army to only be able to deploy 17 battalions out of 52 mobile battalions at Dien Bien Phu, and 20 battalions to hold the vast Northern Delta. Right at the Dien Bien Phu battlefield, our troops organized their forces and battle formations to besiege the entire stronghold group, encircling each resistance center. Our troops built infantry and artillery positions, campaign headquarters, and headquarters of divisions and regiments underground to ensure safety, as well as to ensure that command information was not interrupted. Our troops also deployed anti-aircraft artillery to block the enemy's air supply and protect our transport supply lines. While our troops increasingly tightened the siege, the French troops could not reinforce the Dien Bien Phu battlefield, because the mobile forces were pinned down in strategic areas. In coordination with Dien Bien, our army and people organized attacks on Gia Lam (Hanoi) and Cat Bi (Hai Phong) airports, blocking the air bridge to Dien Bien Phu. That showed the smooth coordination between the main battlefield of the Northwest - Dien Bien Phu and other battlefields, creating a siege, continuous attacks, pushing the enemy to defeat. Thus, in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, our army and people correctly implemented the strategic instructions: "fight to win; fight to destroy; maintain the initiative, resolutely attack". According to Major General Nguyen Hong Quan, we developed the art of attracting and pinning down the French mobile forces, dispersing the enemy on the battlefields , liberating many large areas and especially tightly surrounding the French troops at the Dien Bien Phu stronghold, attacking directly at the enemy's strong points but with many loopholes. The French themselves later had to admit that "the opponent (Viet Minh) was weaker in numbers and bent the enemy's will by relying on the enemy's weaknesses".

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