At Hong Cum, Regiment 57 reinforced the siege, attacked and destroyed many enemy forces. At dawn on May 2, 1954, the enemy had to withdraw from area C. At 4:00 a.m. on May 2, 1954, Regiment 209 (Division 312) captured strongholds 505 and 505A (Dominique 3) on the east bank of the Nam Rom River.
On the night of May 2, 1954, Regiment 36 completely destroyed stronghold 311B (Huguette 4). During the day, our units eliminated 2 enemy battalions from combat, shot down 1 Morane-type observation aircraft and 1 Corsair aircraft.
After our victories, the Eliane Resistance Center, which was defending the eastern side of the stronghold, had only two positions left: A1 (Eliane 2) and C2 (Eliane 4). On the western side of Muong Thanh field, troops opened trenches straight towards De Castries' command post, some places only 300m from the stronghold's command post.
Our assault units are attacking the enemy on hill A1. (Photo: VNA)
On the enemy side: While French troops were besieged in the Dien Bien Phu basin, on May 2, 1954, the US Government was forced to accept the Soviet Government's firm stance that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was a party to the Geneva Conference. With the active support of the Soviet Union, for the first time Vietnam attended a major international conference, although it had not yet been diplomatically recognized by the UK, France, and the US. !
Faced with the risk of being destroyed at Dien Bien Phu, on May 2, 1954, Navarre hurriedly flew from Saigon to Hanoi to convene a meeting to discuss ways to save the situation. Attending the meeting were General Conhi, Colonel Creveco - Commander of the Laotian forces and officers of the army in North Vietnam. Everyone agreed that "Dien Bien Phu cannot be held any longer". General Navarre also reported to France and was told: "No matter what, we must not surrender" !
Faced with that situation, Navarre advocated: Continue to fight to hold out in order to prolong the existence of Dien Bien Phu. If there were a lack of troops, then send reinforcements. If there were a lack of guns, ammunition, and food, then supply them. When there were no longer any conditions to fight, then retreat to Laos; decide to establish "volunteer parachute" teams, meaning that even those who did not know how to parachute would still climb onto the plane, put on a parachute, and jump down. According to French records, in the final stage of the Dien Bien Phu battle, there were 1,800 "volunteer parachutists" including soldiers who were not proficient, had not graduated, or had not even learned how to parachute, who were thrown into the Dien Bien Phu valley.
Under Navarre's direct supervision, on the day and night of May 2, 1954, 120 tons of supplies were dropped on Dien Bien Phu, of which 50% were lost, contributing to increasing food reserves from three to five days, along with five sets of 105mm artillery shells, three sets of 155mm artillery shells, and three sets of 102mm mortar shells.
Logistics work was flexibly reorganized to ensure the success of the third offensive as well as to effectively utilize resources. In the book " Logistics work of Dien Bien Phu campaign " published by the General Department of Logistics in 1979 , it was written: After the second phase, the General Department and the units all learned from experience, clearly seeing the important effect of arranging the rear near or far greatly affecting all aspects of support work, so they made adjustments. Moving the unit's logistics line closer to the front line was also a very fierce ideological struggle. After that, the rear of the units moved closer to the front line. At that time, we had tightly surrounded it, the enemy could not penetrate, so we proposed the transportation policy at the front line "promoting the effect of machinery at the front line", taking advantage of the use of cars to reduce the transportation by people on the battlefield. To avoid congestion in the trenches, reduce casualties and reduce traffic obstruction, we proposed the motto "reduce the number of people, increase productivity", only leaving healthy and productive people on the battlefield.
Author: Major, Master Tran Quoc Dung , Institute of Military History , Ngoc Toan Thu Photo: VNA Presentation: VU ANH TUAN
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