'Ring of fire' on the Dien Bien Phu trenches

"Dien Bien Phu is an impregnable stronghold, don't listen to General Giap and attack. If you attack, there will be no way back to your parents." The loudspeakers calling for surrender from the Him Lam base of the French expeditionary army echoed day and night in the mountains and forests of Muong Thanh, over and over again. But the soldiers of the 312th Division surrounding the French base were not shaken. "We didn't pay attention because our fighting spirit was high, everyone was waiting for the moment to open fire," veteran Nguyen Huu Chap, Regiment 209, Division 312, recounted the days of "digging mountains, sleeping in tunnels, in the pouring rain, eating rice balls" on the Dien Bien Phu trenches. Marching from midnight to dawn, holding out all day long in trenches as deep as the head, only as wide as an arm, but no one wavered, patiently waiting for the order to attack. All soldiers were ready for a long battle of "fighting steadily, advancing steadily". "This was a battle that could not be lost", General Vo Nguyen Giap recounted in his memoir Dien Bien Phu - Historical Rendezvous . At that time, the French invasion of the three Indochinese countries (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam) had entered its ninth year. All sides were in a stalemate, with no clear winner. France was increasingly exhausted in both human and material terms - losing more than 320,000 soldiers and officers and spending 3,000 billion francs. The authorities wanted to find an "honorable way out" to end the war. The responsibility of creating that turning point was given to Henri Navarre (Nava), Commander-in-Chief of the 7th Indochina Expeditionary Army. A combat plan bearing his own name was drawn up by the new commander, with aid from the American ally. Nava set a goal within 18 months to build a mobile force that would surpass the enemy, turn the situation around, and seek victory. At the same time, the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Operational Plan was approved by the Vietnamese Politburo, identifying the Northwest as the main direction of operation. In mid-November 1953, the main force set out for the front. The military moves of the Vietnamese army made the enemy unable to sit still. Nava decided to mobilize a large number of troops, establishing the strongest stronghold group in Indochina. Dien Bien Phu, located in the west of the Northwest mountains, close to the Vietnam-Laos border, was chosen. Nava assessed that this base would be the "porcupine" blocking the main force of the Viet Minh, helping France stand firm in the Northwest, and at the same time being the "key to protecting Upper Laos". France believed that Dien Bien Phu was the "gamble" that would decide the fate of the war.

On November 20, 1953, France sent paratroopers to retake Dien Bien Phu. Colonel De Castries was assigned to command the Northwest Combat Corps, under General Nava. This was the beginning of a large-scale French offensive, turning the Dien Bien Phu air-infantry base into an "impregnable stronghold". Dien Bien Phu is a valley 18 km long, 6-8 km wide, surrounded by hills and dense forests. French generals determined that its location far from the plains would cause difficulties for the Viet Minh's supply lines, making it impossible to transport large quantities of heavy weapons up the high, rugged mountains. Meanwhile, the French expeditionary force could easily support by air from nearby airports such as Muong Thanh, Hong Cum, or from as far away as Gia Lam, Cat Bi... "The military conditions for victory are complete", the Commander-in-Chief of Indochina confidently declared to his soldiers when the stronghold was just formed.

Map of the French Impregnable Stronghold Group

Faced with the French action, in December 1953, the Politburo decided to choose Dien Bien Phu as the strategic battlefield in the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Plan. The commander of the campaign was General Vo Nguyen Giap. The initial plan was for the Viet Minh army to "fight quickly, win quickly" in 2 days and 3 nights, taking advantage of the time when the French had not yet completed the battlefield. However, analyzing the balance of forces and capabilities of the Viet Minh army at that time, General Vo Nguyen Giap assessed that victory was not certain - the task assigned by President Ho Chi Minh before the battle. At the Party Committee meeting on January 26, 1954, General Giap made "the most difficult decision in his commanding career": Postpone the attack. The battle plan was changed to "fight steadily, advance steadily". The troops retreated to the assembly point, pulled out the artillery, and prepared again for the new way of fighting.

Correlation of forces

"We are still in a weak position and attack hard," General Vo Nguyen Giap assessed the balance of forces before the attack. Normally, the infantry force on the attacking side must be five times the size of the defending side, but the Viet Minh army did not reach this ratio. Regarding artillery, Vietnam was superior to France in terms of the number of batteries, but the amount of artillery ammunition in reserve was very limited. Not to mention, Vietnam had absolutely no tanks or aircraft. The secret weapon in this battle was the 37mm anti-aircraft artillery - sponsored by China and the Soviet Union - which appeared for the first time, but only one regiment could deal with the entire French air force. With the motto "fight firmly, advance firmly", the Viet Minh army's tactic was to attack from the outside, surround and approach the enemy. General Giap outlined three steps: first, bring artillery into the battlefield; then, build a trench system to gradually strangle the French expeditionary force, "cut off" the supply line from the airport; finally, launch a general attack to destroy the enemy. In the new combat plan, the trench battle was decisive. On the one hand, the trench network helped limit casualties caused by French artillery and air force fire, and on the other hand, it was the most effective way to approach enemy bases. This was both a battle line and a shield for the Viet Minh to hide and defend. The campaign was divided into three offensive phases: phase 1, attacking the northern bases, opening the way into the heart of the French army; phase 2, attacking the nerve center; phase 3, completely destroying the "porcupine" Dien Bien Phu. March 13, 1954 was chosen as the opening day. At that time, the four major countries, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, agreed to organize an international conference in Geneva to discuss the restoration of peace in Indochina, scheduled to take place at the end of April 1954. A great victory would be an advantage in the negotiations. France did not want to sit at the negotiating table "empty-handed". As for Vietnam, this is a "must-not-lose" battle.

Vietnam's first goal was to destroy the northern strongholds including Him Lam, Doc Lap, and Ban Keo, to break the French defense line and open the attack on the "porcupine" Dien Bien Phu. Him Lam was the first target. Him Lam fortress was located on three hills, defended by 750 French soldiers. In addition to the "fire net" of modern guns, the trenches here were built by the enemy with a scarf-shaped structure, with many floors interspersed with bunkers. The outer ring had 4-6 rows of barbed wire fences, combined with minefields 100-200 m wide. To approach and break the French siege, the first task of the Viet Minh army was to build a system of fortifications. The task was initially carried out only at night, camouflaged as they went. As soon as it got dark, from their shelters, the troops marched out into the fields, hoes and shovels in hand, working hard to dig the battlefield. There were two types of trenches, both about 1.7 m deep: the axis trench for artillery maneuvering, transporting wounded soldiers, and mobilizing large forces - 1.2 m wide; and the infantry trench for approaching the enemy - 0.5 m wide. When the trenches stretched dozens of kilometers into the fields, the Viet Minh army had no way to hide from the enemy. The French frantically used artillery and air force to bombard day and night, while sending troops to nearby battlefields to level and plant mines to prevent troops from continuing to dig. The two sides began to struggle for every meter of trench, every inch of land was paid for with blood. Along with establishing trench positions, the two important tasks were to pull artillery into the battlefield and provide logistics. Human and material resources in the rear were mobilized to the maximum, with the spirit of "Everything for the front". Hundreds of kilometers of mountain roads were repaired and opened with only shovels, hoes, and a little explosives. The Tuan Giao - Dien Bien route, more than 80 km long, originally intended for pack horses, was hastily widened in 20 days for artillery tractors to assemble at the assembly point. During that time, French planes continuously bombed the roads and rained bullets on the laborers, but could not cut off the Viet Minh's supply line. After nearly two months of preparation, the ammunition and rice in the warehouse were enough for the first phase. The artillery was in the assault position. The trenches were driven straight into the French stronghold. Everything was ready for the decisive battle. At 5:05 p.m. on March 13, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap called the Artillery Command. The attack order was given. 40 artillery pieces fired simultaneously. The Dien Bien Phu campaign officially began.

After 5 days, Vietnam successfully occupied the strongest resistance centers, Him Lam and Doc Lap, forcing Ban Keo to surrender. The Viet Minh army completely destroyed two elite battalions, disintegrated one battalion and three companies of Thai puppets, eliminated 2,000 French soldiers from combat, and shot down 12 planes. "Previously, we thought we could win the battle of Dien Bien Phu, but after those disastrous days, all chances of success were gone," Nava wrote in his memoir The Time of Truth.

After destroying 6 out of 49 French bases, the Viet Minh army set the second goal of advancing into the Central sector, capturing the eastern highlands and Muong Thanh airport. From there, Vietnam tightened the siege, minimizing the ability to supply and reinforce the Dien Bien Phu base group. This was the longest, fiercest and decisive phase. The Central sector was located on the eastern hill range of Muong Thanh field, with 5 base clusters with 10,000 troops. After the first failure, General Nava quickly reinforced Dien Bien Phu with two parachute battalions. The defense organization was also consolidated. In an area of ​​about 2.5 km2, the French army placed 12 105 mm cannons, 4 155 mm cannons, 24 120 mm and 81 mm mortars, and reserved about 100,000 rounds of ammunition. To fight against the strong French army, the important task ahead was to develop the siege and attack positions. This time, the scale of the trench system was expanded. The trench system surrounded the entire French position in the Central sector. The infantry trench ran from the units' positions in the forest to the fields, cutting across the trench, advancing towards the targets we intended to destroy. "The time we dug trenches was also the time we fought. When the French came to cover our positions, we dug again and at the same time arranged troops to fight back. Many of my comrades were sacrificed while still holding hoes and shovels in their hands," recalled veteran Pham Ba Mieu, Regiment 174, Division 316. To protect the position, infantry units also moved to live in the newly dug trenches. The Viet Minh's system of offensive and siege trenches gradually moved in, passing through barbed wire, forming "rings of fire", gradually tightening the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. The French were well aware of the progress of the Vietnamese trenches through daily aerial photographs, but failed to stop them. By the end of March, 100 km of Viet Minh trenches had been formed in 10 days, and the trenches had crawled to the foot of the French stronghold. The southern sector of Hong Cum was completely cut off from the center. Vietnam was ready for a second attack on the "impregnable" stronghold.

After two defeats, the French campaign command tried to reassure the soldiers on the front. Realizing that Dien Bien Phu was about to enter the rainy season, General De Castries advocated maintaining a stalemate until mid-May, hoping that the weather would make it difficult for the trenches and transportation routes of the Viet Minh army. At that time, the enemy would increase the number of aircraft bombing around the base and block the supply route. Meanwhile, Vietnam wanted to quickly end the battle before the rainy season. General Giap set a goal of solving the "porcupine" Dien Bien Phu before the opening day of the Geneva Conference to help the Vietnamese delegation appear as the winner. The final attack was a race against time. The third mission was a general attack, destroying all French expeditionary troops in Dien Bien Phu. This time, the destination of the trenches was the De Castries Command Headquarters. At 5:00 p.m. on May 1, 1954, all Vietnamese artillery caliber fired at the stronghold. The third attack began.

The group of fortified bases was defeated, the Nava plan officially went bankrupt, leaving the country's authorities stunned. More than 10,000 French expeditionary soldiers were captured, of which about 1,000 seriously wounded soldiers lay piled up in hospital basements for two months of fighting. When the gunfire ended, Viet Minh medics brought them to the surface, treated them and returned them to France. One day after France's defeat, on May 8, 1954, the Geneva Conference opened. Here, France was forced to recognize the freedom, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the three countries of Vietnam - Laos - Cambodia, ending nearly a century of domination. For the first time in history, a colonial country with a small army and rudimentary equipment defeated a powerful colonial empire.

The Vietnam People's Army celebrates on the roof of General De Castries' bunker when the Dien Bien Phu campaign was completely victorious, on the afternoon of May 7, 1954. Source: Vietnam News Agency

Content: May Trinh - Phung Tien

Graphics: Khanh Hoang - Thanh Ha

The article uses materials from: - Dien Bien Phu - Historical rendezvous (Memoirs of General Vo Nguyen Giap) - Vo Nguyen Giap - Famous generals of the Ho Chi Minh era - The time of truths (Memoirs of Henri Navarre) - The Battles of Dien Bien Phu (Jules Roy) - The road to Dien Bien Phu (Christopher Goscha) - Hell in a very small place; the siege of Dien Bien Phu (Bernard B.Fall) - The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam (Martin Windrow) About the photos in the article: - Photos of French and Vietnamese commanders: Ministry of National Defense's electronic information portal (General Vo Nguyen Giap, Hoang Van Thai); Family-provided documents (Major General Dang Kim Giang and Political Commissar Le Liem); National Archives Center I (Henri Navarre); French media agencies (officer Jean Pouget and author Jules Roy) - Photos of weapons and military aircraft were compiled from sources: Dien Bien Phu Historical Victory Museum, Vietnam Military History Museum, and French and American military information sites - The battle in the article was outlined based on the map in the book Traitez à tout (Jean Julien Fonde); Dien Bien Phu - Historical Rendezvous (Vo Nguyen Giap); and Dien Bien Phu - The Victory of the Century (many authors).

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