Our 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun shot down the C119 aircraft. This was the first twin-fuselage aircraft of the enemy that our army shot down in Dien Bien Phu.
On the enemy side: On the night of April 9, the enemy reinforced with 1 more battalion, the 2nd Airborne Legion. Because of the rain, this battalion only reached two companies and a part of the command post.
At 5:30 a.m., the enemy concentrated their forces to counterattack and attempt to retake stronghold C1. The fighting between us and the enemy was very fierce. Each side occupied half of the stronghold.
Muong Thanh Airport was shelled by our army during the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. Photo: VNA
The movement of encroachment, sniping and parachute capture had completely changed the face of the central area of the group. The enemy's life was in a state of constant tension and deprivation. The wounded were piled up in narrow bunkers, lacking supplies and medicine. French and Western journalists called it "Living next to death", "Living in a corner of hell". Later, in the chapter about "The suffocating stronghold group" in the book "History of the Indochina War", French General Y.Gras recounted as follows:
"...From April 9, the logistics situation of the stronghold became dire. The requirement was to replenish 200 tons of ammunition per day, but the highest was only 145 tons dropped, of which the French side only captured 100 tons at most. Supply aircraft suffered an average loss of 15 to 20%. Supplying the stronghold became real air operations in the very unfavorable meteorological conditions of the mountainous battlefield...".
"… The most worrying thing is that the drop zone (mainly located between the central area and Hong Cum) has been increasingly narrowed like a piece of dried leather. Only about 100 hectares remain, almost completely under enemy infantry fire…".
"… The collection of scattered packages on the ground required a lot of manpower. That alone was a heavy task. Thus, the Dien Bien Phu stronghold was suffocated not by the impact of the enemy's air defense force but mainly by the activities of the Viet Minh divisions on the ground, right next to the French position. These divisions did not use the method of massive attack but spent three weeks continuously encircling and squeezing the garrison on a square of land measuring 1km on each side. Each stronghold was tightly wrapped in a system of trenches, like an insect caught in a spider web. The position became isolated, blockaded and quickly suffocated due to lack of ammunition, food and especially lack of water".
- On our side: Our 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun shot down the C119 plane. This was the first twin-fuselage plane of the enemy that our army shot down in Dien Bien Phu.
One of the 62 French planes shot down by our air defense force, burning in the sky of Dien Bien Phu. Photo: VNA
According to the book “General Hoang Van Thai’s Collection”, General Hoang Van Thai recounted: On the morning of April 9, 1954, the cadres returned to their units with new spirit. The results of the second round of the conference quickly turned into positive actions by all units. And it was with these important results that our army achieved victories in the political and ideological education campaign, fighting against negative rightist tendencies organized by the Party Committee at the end of April.
Immediately after the preliminary conference of the front, we organized a conference of the chiefs of staff of the divisions and regiments to evaluate the achievements and responsibilities of the staff in the recent battle. All the staff officers saw their share of responsibility for the shortcomings of the officers and the units. As for the campaign staff, reality increasingly proved that we had to pay more attention to directing the units on specific tactical issues for the troops, especially in the conditions where many very new contents were being posed in the first large-scale offensive campaign in the history of our Army.
We paid close attention to the experience of the 36th Regiment using the method of encroaching with small units to destroy position 106. They placed artillery in Keo village, gradually destroying each gun emplacement and each enemy bunker on the outer perimeter of base 106, then suddenly charged into the post. More than a hundred enemy soldiers were caught off guard. Our troops quickly took control of the position.
12.7mm artillery position shooting down enemy aircraft supplying the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. Photo: VNA
The issue that we discussed in depth at this meeting of the Chiefs of Staff was what to do to help the units overcome the recent tactical shortcomings. The upcoming tasks of the divisions were determined by the Campaign Command in the directive dated April 10. Based on the assigned tasks and on the basis of analyzing the specific enemy situation within the division's area of responsibility as well as the actual situation of the units, the issue we raised for discussion was how to apply appropriate fighting methods to limit the enemy's strengths, exploit the enemy's weaknesses, and limit our casualties. Along with discussing the task of continuing to develop the siege and attack positions, we exchanged many opinions on how to attack, sniping, directing the "brave" teams to penetrate deep and attack dangerously, organizing forces and directing continuous fighting day and night. We also discussed how to take advantage of the time to train the newly recruited recruits, especially the four individual technical and tactical training contents, to regularly and promptly reorganize the fighting force continuously; how to build a solid defensive position on the occupied high points in the East... all the issues discussed were aimed at preparing conditions for the final attack.
After the conference, based on a thorough discussion of the mission of threatening the airport and controlling enemy airspace, we exchanged ideas with Mr. Vuong Thua Vu and Mr. Le Trong Tan about preparing to destroy position 105, attack positions 206 and 311, and attack enemy reinforcements in both the East and West directions. Through the discussion and from the actual combat experience of destroying position 106 of the 36th Regiment as well as the experience of breaking down some fences and destroying enemy bunkers at positions 105 and 206, the concept of using small units to "encroach" in field-based fortifications became increasingly clear, with a theoretical basis in our thinking. With the results of the discussion in the staff conference and the approval of the Campaign Command.
(excerpt)
1. General Vo Nguyen Giap: Complete Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2010.
2. General Hoang Van Thai: Complete Works, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2007.
3. Dien Bien Phu Campaign - Facts and Figures/Nguyen Van Thiet - Le Xuan Thanh, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2014.
4. Dien Bien Phu - seen from two sides, Thanh Nien Publishing House, 2004.
5. Dien Bien Phu - Historical Rendezvous/Memories of General Vo Nguyen Giap by writer Huu Mai, Information and Communication Publishing House, 2018.
According to People's Army Newspaper
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