On April 8, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap sent a "Letter calling on Dien Bien Phu soldiers to step up the competition to snipe the enemy."
On our side: In the memoir "Dien Bien Phu - Historical Rendezvous", General, Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap wrote:
On April 8, 1954, after hearing the new combat strategy, an officer said: "The superiors have chosen the right medicine." Everyone realized that there would be nothing that the troops could not do with the tasks assigned to them by the Campaign Command this time.
I sent a "Letter calling on Dien Bien Phu soldiers to step up the competition to snipe the enemy." The letter said:
"The enemy's central area is now within the range of our firepower. To make the enemy increasingly exhausted, their morale low, their casualties pile up, to make the enemy always fearful and tense, unable to eat well, unable to sleep well, and at any time they could be shot dead, to create conditions for our army to gain greater victories, and to advance to annihilate the entire enemy force in Dien Bien Phu.
I call:
All the riflemen, machine gunners, mortarmen, artillerymen.
Let's promote the spirit of actively destroying the enemy and strive to compete in sniping the enemy in Dien Bien Phu.
One bullet one enemy!...".
General Vo Nguyen Giap reviews the formation of army units participating in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign in 1954 right at the front. Photo: VNA
The presence of our troops on some hills to the east threatened the positions of the central sub-sector on both banks of the Nam Rom River.
The enemy knew that sooner or later artillery positions would appear on the Dominique heights. But the hot spot at the moment was Eliane. Here our troops had taken control of C1 and part of A1. The two heights were adjacent to each other. But at A1, our troops had only occupied a part of the low hill on the outside. For now, the soldiers of the 97th Regiment on Hill C1 were pushing the Eastern sector into a very dangerous situation. This height directly threatened Hill C2 on the inside, which was lower than it, and Eliane 3 on the riverbank, where the counterattack force was concentrated. Enemy soldiers leaving their fortifications immediately became targets for sharpshooters. Grenade launchers placed on the hill threatened soldiers moving in the trenches.
The divisions deployed their missions to attack positions, to block reinforcements, to consolidate garrison positions, and to dig traffic trenches. In just 10 days of the second attack, the snipers of the 312th Division killed 110 enemies, equal to the number of enemy troops eliminated in a siege. Soldier Luc Van Thong of the 165th Regiment killed 30 enemies in one day of sniping. Soldier Doan Tuong of the 88th Regiment used 9 rifle bullets to kill 9 enemies.
Our army successfully applied the "sneaking" tactic, digging trenches and secretly approaching deep into the enemy's fort. Photo: VNA
The small but effective fighting style achieved visible results, further inspiring the troops. The marksmen sought unexpected positions, not sparing any enemy who emerged from their fortifications.
The tactics of encroachment and sniping are increasingly effective. With this method of fighting, we win step by step, limit casualties, and do not have to waste much ammunition.
On the enemy side: The enemy reinforced the 4th Airborne Battalion for Dien Bien Phu. Learning from our experience, Bigia ordered a trench to be dug from C2 to C1 to prepare for a decisive counterattack.
(excerpt)
1. General Vo Nguyen Giap: Complete Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2010.
2. General Hoang Van Thai: Complete Works, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2007.
3. Dien Bien Phu Campaign - Facts and Figures/Nguyen Van Thiet-Le Xuan Thanh, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2014.
4. Dien Bien Phu - seen from two sides, Thanh Nien Publishing House, 2004.
5. Dien Bien Phu - Historical Rendezvous/Memories of General Vo Nguyen Giap by writer Huu Mai, Information and Communication Publishing House, 2018.
According to People's Army Newspaper
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