With the stormy attack of Regiment 36, Division 308, our troops surrounded and pressed close to the center of Muong Thanh, about 300 meters from De Castries' command post, forcing the enemy into a passive and confused position. At the same time, a company of ours was ordered to station at Na Ti village, preventing the enemy from carrying out a break-out operation, codenamed Albatros (Seagull), to escape to Laos.
Regiment 36, Division 308 took control of base 311B.
After two days (May 1 and 2, 1954) of stormy attacks, our troops took control of four enemy strongholds: “C1, 505, 505A in the East and 311A in the West. In the Hong Cum direction, the siege and encroachment of area C by Regiment 57, Division 304, exhausted many enemy forces, forcing them to retreat from area C. The enemy artillery position in Hong Cum was paralyzed, unable to return fire. An enemy artillery ammunition depot, with 3,000 reserve rounds, exploded. The enemy’s food and food storage caught fire.” (1)
“On the night of May 3, 1954, Regiment 36, Division 308, continued to attack like a storm on the 311B stronghold in the West. Although the preparation time was short, the trenches had not been dug very close to the enemy bunkers, and from the very first minute the entire fire support position for our infantry was bombarded by enemy artillery, Regiment 36, Division 308, still quickly took control of the 311B stronghold in the West of the enemy in less than an hour.
In the Eastern area, on the outer high point range, after C1 was lost, the last Elian cluster, which blocked the eastern side of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold, was like a tripod with only two legs (only A1 and C2 remained). Except for the two high points A1 and C2, the Eastern hill range had turned into our army's firepower field. The Elian cluster was in danger of being destroyed. The remaining enemy strongholds at the foot of the hill, nestled on the banks of the Nam Rom River, were trembling in fear, waiting for the thunder that could strike at any moment.
On the vast flat plains to the west under the charge of the 308th Division, where the enemy previously thought they could easily control with aircraft and heavy artillery, now, after the two strongholds 311A and 311B fell into the hands of our troops, waves of trenches were approaching very close to De Castries's Command Post. Our offensive and siege positions were getting tighter and tighter. The enemy's land and airspace were gradually being narrowed by our troops. More than 20 remaining strongholds in the depths* of Muong Thanh were under strong threat. In some places, our troops were only about 300 meters away from De Castries' Command Post, forcing the enemy into a passive and confused position.
The enemy's Dien Bien Phu stronghold was squeezed tighter between two steel pincers. De Castries and his remaining ten thousand soldiers began to suffocate in the "last square". (2)
“Later, through the prisoners, we learned more details about the miserable situation of the French colonialists during the last few days of our army's attack. They had mobilized troops but still had no force left to counterattack. The artillery was also out of ammunition.” (3)
The enemy planned to launch the Albatros (Seagull) plan to escape.
Realizing that the Dien Bien Phu stronghold was about to be destroyed, Navarre, General Cogny, Commander of the French forces in Laos Creveco and officers of the army held an urgent meeting in Hanoi on May 2, 1954, to discuss ways to save the situation in Dien Bien Phu. They wanted to open a bloody path to break the siege, with a siege-breaking operation codenamed Albatros (Seagull).
"This operation to break the siege of Albatros relied solely on the garrison at Dien Bien Phu, with the support of a small local commando force in Laos to create a corridor. General Navarre believed that the operation could be carried out in two or three days by force, or secretly and cleverly, because "the Viet Minh had no logistical means in Laos, and could only respond after 24 hours".
Therefore, they planned to gather forces and organize them into three wings, taking advantage of the night to break through the siege of our troops and flee towards Upper Laos. Accordingly: the first wing, consisting of paratroopers, withdrew to the Southeast. The second wing, consisting of Foreign Legion and North African units, withdrew to the South. The third wing, consisting of units in Hong Cum, withdrew to the West. Meanwhile, in Upper Laos, they would send a wing to pick them up. General De Castries and some units were assigned to stay with the wounded at Dien Bien Phu.
Our army closely monitored the enemy's intentions and preparations to flee from the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. On May 3, 1954, our army units tasked with holding the positions in the West were ordered to strictly control all major and minor roads leading from Dien Bien Phu to the Vietnam - Laos border. One of our companies was ordered to station at Na Ti village, preventing the enemy from carrying out a siege-breaking operation, codenamed Albatros (Seagull), to escape to Laos. (4)
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* tung tham: to penetrate deeply (Open Dictionary - Ho Ngoc Duc, Dictionary - Nguyen Lan); depth of the battlefield (Great Vietnamese Dictionary)
[ Source: VNA;
(1) Dien Bien Phu Campaign: Facts and Figures, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2024, p. 115;
(2) Dien Bien Phu: The victory of the century, Information and Communication Publishing House, Hanoi, 2014, pp. 340, 341;
(3) General Hoang Van Thai and the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2024, p. 314;
(4) General Vo Nguyen Giap: Dien Bien Phu, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2024, p.107 ].
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