General Vo Nguyen Giap visited the Air Defense - Air Force Command on December 30, 1972, the core force together with the army and people of the capital defeated the US strategic air raid on Hanoi. Photo: VNA
The units received orders on the night of April 7, 1975 to increase the speed of their march, fighting the enemy as they went, clearing the way to the campaign assembly location as prescribed. The technical units of the Ministry reinforced the northern wing, which was far away, carrying bulky loads, and the last unit arrived at the assembly location no later than April 26, 1975.
On the same day, the leading force of the 2nd Corps (except for the 324th Division which was assigned to stay behind to protect Hue and Da Nang), reinforced by the 3rd Division and the 3rd Armored Battalion of Military Region 5, began marching along Route 1 towards the South. The Corps' marching formation was quite long, consisting of 2,276 vehicles carrying troops and goods, 89 armored tanks, and 223 artillery tractors. The total number of troops participating in the march was more than 32,400.
* Also on April 7, 1975, at Ta Thiet base (Loc Ninh), the representative of the General Command met with the Central Committee and the Military Commission of the region to approve the military attack plan on the Saigon front. The conference emphasized: While urgently preparing for a large-scale campaign plan... if the enemy suddenly disintegrates, we will not wait for the main force of the Ministry to enter, but with the available forces, quickly and boldly attack straight into Saigon, combine with special forces, commandos and the masses rising up from within to capture Saigon, or at least create a favorable position for the basic plan of liberating Saigon with the main force, with overwhelming advantage over the enemy.
Also at the Conference, comrade Le Duc Tho announced the Politburo's decision to establish the Saigon - Gia Dinh Liberation Campaign Command. General Van Tien Dung, Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army, was the Commander; comrade Pham Hung, Secretary of the Central Bureau, was the Political Commissar.
The 4th Corps (lacking the 9th Division, which had reinforced the 232nd Division in the Southwest) and the 6th Division, the main force of Military Region 7, were assigned the task of coordinating an attack on Xuan Loc town, a solid defense line considered the "steel door" of the puppet army, to open the eastern gate to attack Saigon.
Also during these April days, the Saigon - Gia Dinh City Party Committee and City Team sent 1,700 underground cadres to communes, wards, districts, and inner and outer cities to mobilize and organize the masses to be ready to rise up and provide food and water for the troops when the main force of the Liberation Army attacked the inner city. The City Party Committee and City Team also sent hundreds of commandos and self-defense soldiers to the suburbs to welcome and guide our troops to enter and capture key targets, such as: Tan Son Nhat airport, the General Staff, the Independence Palace, the City Police Department, and the Capital Special Zone.
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Source: VNA; Historical Moments: Ho Chi Minh Campaign 1975, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2005; Campaigns that were decisive for victory in the Great Spring Victory of 1975, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2010; Historical Events and Figures, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2015; Historical Decisions, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2015; Ministry of National Defense - Vietnam Military History Institute: Vietnam Military History, Volume 11, National Political Publishing House Truth, Hanoi, 2019; General Van Tien Dung: Great Spring Victory, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2024; From the Battle of Phai Khat, Na Ngan to the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2024.
Hoang Yen/VNA (Synthesis)
Source: https://baotintuc.vn/nhan-vat-su-kien/ngay-741975-dai-tuong-tong-tu-lenh-vo-nguyen-giap-lenh-cho-cac-don-vi-than-toc-than-toc-hon-nua-tao-bao-tao-bao-hon-nua-20250407065701857.htm
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