On April 28, 1954, all for victory.

The Dien Bien Phu Campaign: On April 28, 1954, along the campaign lines, all personnel and resources were concentrated in a race against the weather and the enemy. The civilian labor brigades that had set out to support the campaign since winter were now in the summer.

On our side : The Front Command called on the soldiers of Dien Bien Phu to intensify the "hunt for the French, sniper" movement and prepare for the third offensive. Continue to annihilate enemy forces, capture the high ground in the East and strongholds in the West, bring all our firepower of all calibers closer to control the airspace, threaten the central area, increase the attrition of enemy forces, and seize opportunities for resupply and a general offensive to annihilate all enemy troops in Dien Bien Phu.

Long lines of carts on the road to the campaign. Photo: VNA

On the campaign routes, all personnel and resources were poured into a race against the weather and the enemy. Civilian labor brigades that had set out to serve the campaign since winter were now in the summer. Even the best carts had become rickety and patched up. Transport trucks, running continuously without maintenance, were becoming more and more dilapidated each day.

The tireless legs of tens of thousands of people continued to cross mountain passes, wade through streams, and brave bombs and bullets. The transport vehicles also refused to give up halfway, continuing to overcome landslide-prone slopes despite enemy air raids. The greatest difficulty for the drivers was not only the bombs and bullets, but also the struggle against drowsiness after many sleepless nights behind the wheel.

During this campaign, political work made significant progress to meet the growing demands. A large force of artists and performing arts troupes were present, forming a special unit within the campaign's formation. The General Political Department even brought along a printing press unit.

Officers and soldiers read the People's Army Newspaper to stay informed about the battlefield during the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. (Archival photo)

In particular, during the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, the People's Army Newspaper directly organized its editorial office at the front lines, conveying all the leadership's directives, reflecting the battles in a timely manner, becoming an indispensable source of spiritual nourishment for officers and soldiers, contributing to motivating the spirit and determination to win of the troops and civilian workers.

Songs and poems were composed right on the battlefield, and valuable documentary footage was created for history. Cultural troupes performed in the trenches and artillery bunkers. Leaflets aimed at mobilizing enemy soldiers were distributed deep into the enemy's central area. By the end of April, we had completed the construction of a loudspeaker system around the enemy's fortified complex, constantly influencing the thoughts of the enemy soldiers living in "hell on earth."

The close attention given by staff and political officers to the units participating in the campaign was a result of the summer training. The officers worked with local cadres to resolve on-site difficulties and promptly reported all aspects of the situation to the Party Committee and the Front Command. The logistics leaders were always on the front lines to closely monitor the situation.

People in Thanh Hoa province bid farewell to groups of civilian laborers carrying goods on bicycles as they set off to serve the front lines in 1954. (Archival photo)

To meet the campaign's demands, the Party Committee and people of Thanh Hoa contributed nearly 11,000 tons of food and supplies, almost depleting their reserves. After the victory, the State had to implement numerous measures to alleviate famine and quickly restore production in Thanh Hoa. The people of Northwest Vietnam, mainly from the four districts of Tuan Giao, Dien Bien Phu, Quynh Nhai, and Thuan Chau, contributed 32,000 laborers, 7,310 tons of rice, and 389 tons of meat. Tuan Giao district, bordering Dien Bien Phu and with sparse land, contributed 1,200 tons of rice to the front lines, far exceeding the initial target set by the supply agency. In many places, people also contributed rice seeds. After the campaign, the rear had to immediately transport rice seeds and agricultural tools to Northwest Vietnam to help the people resume production.

By the end of April 1954, despite the enemy's fierce and frantic resistance, our troops' encirclement of Muong Thanh and Hong Cum had tightened. All preparations for the third offensive were essentially complete.

On the enemy side : In reality, the enemy was in a state of "strangulation." Their occupied territory was very narrow, and food and ammunition were running out. The situation regarding supplies to the Dien Bien Phu stronghold was so difficult that Cogny had to cable Navarre to report: "The results of the parachute drops to Dien Bien Phu on the 28th, the night of the 28th, the 29th, and the night of the 29th were zero. Only Hong Cum received 22 tons." Before the third offensive, De Castries sent a cable to Cogny stating, "Dien Bien Phu only has 275 155mm rounds, 140,000 105mm rounds, and 5,000 120mm mortar rounds left." De Castries' request was for urgent supplies.

As the fighting intensified, the number of wounded French officers and soldiers increased rapidly, causing them significant difficulties. In late April, heavy rains turned the trenches into muddy swamps. The French soldiers' lives, huddled in the mud, under constant bombardment and relentless rain, quickly depleted their strength and demoralized them. Seeing the imminent threat of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold being destroyed, the French government officially requested the US government to launch Operation Vautour to relieve the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. However, internal disagreements within the US leadership led to the plan being ultimately abandoned. Navarre also considered a relief operation from the Nam Hu River basin (Upper Laos) towards Dien Bien Phu, and Cogny once again planned to deploy approximately four mobile units to penetrate deep into our rear. Lacking the necessary forces and resources, these plans were, in reality, mere wishful thinking of the French Indochina Command in the face of the already sealed fate of Dien Bien Phu.

In coordination with the Dien Bien Phu battlefield.

In Military Region 4, we attacked Uu Diem and Pho Trach, eliminating over 200 enemy soldiers and burning down one fuel depot.

THANH VINH/qdnd.vn

Source: https://baothanhhoa.vn/chien-dich-dien-bien-phu-ngay-28-4-1954-tat-ca-de-chien-thang-212837.htm