On May 2, Navarre hurriedly flew from Saigon to Hanoi. Navarre called an emergency meeting to discuss ways to save the situation. Attending the meeting were Navarre, Cogny and officers of the army forces in the battlefield of North Vietnam.
On our side: At 2:00 a.m. on May 2, Regiment 209 completely destroyed the two strongholds 505 and 505A, ending the existence of the Dominique resistance center. On the western field, the battle to destroy the stronghold 811A of Regiment 88 took place very quickly. The encroachment tactic continued to be promoted. With trenches dug through the stronghold fence, our troops suddenly organized a charge. The entire Euro-African Company, which had just arrived to replace the troops to strengthen the defense of this stronghold, was completely destroyed in less than 80 minutes.
Our army successfully applied the tactic of "sneaking in", digging trenches, secretly approaching deep into the enemy's fort, making the French army feel like our troops were "coming out of the ground" right in the middle of the enemy's fort. Photo: VNA
At Hong Cum, the siege and encroachment of the 57th Regiment in Zone C had exhausted many enemy troops, so on the morning of May 2, the enemy had to retreat from here. The deep trenches of our troops in the western field were all aimed straight at the De Castries Command Post. The stronghold had been forced into the last "square".
On the enemy side: On May 2, Navarre hurriedly flew from Saigon to Hanoi. Navarre called an emergency meeting to discuss ways to save the situation. Attending the meeting were Navarre, Cogny and officers of the army in the North Vietnam battlefield. The battle at Dien Bien Phu had lasted 50 days and nights. At this time, Navarre did not know that his biggest mistake was to disperse most of the mobile forces concentrated in the Red River Delta before the battle began. In addition to the elite battalions sent to the Northwest, the 3 mobile armies of the North were still held back in Central Laos. During the past time, plans to save Dien Bien Phu could not be implemented due to lack of forces, especially the paratroopers and air force. If the few paratrooper battalions were thrown into relief operations, there would be no reinforcements to maintain the life of the stronghold. If the air force were mobilized for the Xenophon and Condor operations, there would be no more forces to support and supply Dien Bien Phu on a daily basis. The strategic battle of Dien Bien Phu came to a decisive moment when Navarre only had one parachute battalion left.
General Henri Navarre, Commander-in-Chief of the French Expeditionary Force in Indochina. Photo: AP
The Geneva Conference had opened, but was still discussing the Korean issue. Representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were not present. France's last hope now was to reach a ceasefire agreement at Dien Bien Phu.
But to do so, at least the “porcupine” Dien Bien Phu needed more time. The French government absolutely did not want to see a surrender at Dien Bien Phu. The telegrams sent back by De Castries and Langlais were harsh and desperate. The fate of Dien Bien Phu was only a matter of days. Maybe tomorrow if there were no reinforcements. Cogny once again suggested launching an operation to attack the enemy’s rear. This was just short-sighted thinking.
French prisoners of war wounded after each battle were given first aid by Viet Minh forces and taken back to the rear. Photo: Getty Images
Wounded French soldiers are moved to the rear by helicopter. Photo: Getty Images
Where could we get the forces to launch such an operation at this time? All the mobile troops were bogged down in the Northern Delta, in Central Laos, in the Central region. There was no time to mobilize them. And how could we supply ammunition and food for a new operation when the entire transport air force, including the heavy aircraft of the US, could not meet the urgent requirements of Dien Bien Phu alone?
Interrogation of French pilot prisoners. Photo: Getty Images
Navarre declared: "There is no need to continue the war at Dien Bien Phu. Navarre decided to carry out a different siege operation from the previous plans (Xenophon mobilized 15 battalions, Condor mobilized 7 battalions), the siege operation codenamed Albatros (Big Seagull) this time relied only on the garrison at Dien Bien Phu itself with the support of a small local commando force in Laos to create a corridor. Navarre believed that the operation could be carried out in two or three days by force, or secretly, cleverly, because the Viet Minh had no logistical means in Laos, and could only be dealt with after 24 hours". Navarre decided to leave behind the wounded and medical officers, because he was sure that they would be returned by the Viet Minh. Due to the nature of such an operation, it was left to De Castries to plan it himself.
Navarre agreed with Cogny to reinforce Dien Bien Phu with an additional parachute battalion. This was the last parachute battalion. Up to now, Navarre had used this force very cautiously, according to the principle of not sacrificing any battalion in vain. But this time, Navarre realized that in order to break the siege of Dien Bien Phu, the hedgehog, more strength had to be added.
THANH VINH/qdnd.vn
Source
Comment (0)