“The great battle of Dien Bien Phu has been recorded in national history as a Bach Dang, a Chi Lang or a Dong Da in the 20th century; and entered world history as a brilliant feat, breaking through the stronghold of the colonial slavery system of imperialism” (General Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Duan)
General De Castries, who directly commanded the Dien Bien Phu stronghold and the French military headquarters, surrendered - the Dien Bien Phu campaign was a complete victory. (The image is reproduced on the Panorama painting, belonging to the Dien Bien Phu Historical Victory Museum).
With the construction of the most powerful stronghold in Indochina at Dien Bien Phu, the French colonialists considered this "a trap or a crusher, ready to crush the enemy's steel divisions". Grasping the French colonialists' intention to attract our main force to destroy it, then switch to attacking us, the Party Central Committee's Politburo was determined to destroy all enemy troops at the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. At the same time, President Ho Chi Minh instructed: "This campaign is an important campaign, not only militarily but also politically, not only domestically but also internationally. Therefore, the entire army, the entire people, and the entire Party must concentrate on completing it successfully". With the slogan "All for the front, all for victory", our people devoted all their human and material resources to this historic campaign. By early March 1954, preparations on all fronts were completed.
On March 13, 1954, our army opened fire to launch the first attack on the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. After 5 days of fighting, we quickly destroyed the enemy's two most fortified strongholds, Him Lam and Doc Lap; disintegrated another enemy battalion and destroyed the Ban Keo stronghold. We killed and captured 2,000 enemies, shot down 12 planes, opened the entrance to the center of the stronghold, threatened Muong Thanh Airport and dealt a shocking blow to the enemy's morale.
The war situation was tense and fierce beyond the enemy's calculations. On March 16, 1954, they sent 3 parachute battalions to reinforce the Dien Bien Phu stronghold. On March 30, 1954, we launched a second attack on the eastern hills of the central sector. Attacking the eastern sector, we destroyed 2,500 enemies, occupied most of the important high points, consolidated from above, created more conditions to divide, encircle, and control the enemy, and switched to a general attack to destroy the enemy.
“Comparison of forces between us and the enemy at the time of March 1954: In terms of troops, the enemy had 444,900 troops, we had 238,000 troops; in terms of artillery, the enemy had 594 guns, we had 80 guns; in terms of tanks and armored vehicles, the enemy had 10e+6d+10c, we had 0; in terms of aircraft, the enemy had 580, we had 0; in terms of warships, the enemy had 391, we had 0”. |
Faced with that situation, the French colonialists concentrated most of their fighter and transport aircraft in Indochina to reinforce the Dien Bien Phu front. At the same time, the US imperialists urgently reinforced France with 100 fighter bombers, 50 transport aircraft, and lent France 29 manned C119 aircraft; established an air bridge to transport parachutes from Japan and the US to the Dien Bien Phu front. The US imperialists also sent 2 aircraft carriers to the Gulf of Tonkin to practice "massive landings in Indochina".
On our side, through two battles, our forces were constantly strengthened. Our troops made extraordinary efforts, fought bravely, and achieved many brilliant feats. However, due to the continuous, long-lasting, and fierce fighting, and the increasing difficulty in supplying supplies, negative thoughts, fear of casualties, and fatigue arose. Implementing the Politburo's directive, a wide-ranging political activity was carried out from Party committees to Party cells, from cadres to soldiers in all units across the front. Negative rightist thoughts were deeply criticized, and the spirit of radical revolution and determination to fight and win were strongly promoted.
Based on that training session, on May 1, 1954, we launched the third attack, successively capturing the remaining strongholds in the East and West, breaking the enemy's counterattacks. On May 7, 1954, our troops raised the victory flag, advanced straight into the enemy command post, General De Castries and the entire staff of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold were captured alive. After 55 days and nights of extremely heroic fighting, the historic Dien Bien Phu campaign was completely victorious. We destroyed and captured 16,200 enemies; captured 28 artillery pieces, 5,915 large and small guns, 3 tanks, 64 cars, 43 tons of communication equipment, 20 tons of military medicine, 40 tons of canned food, 40,000 liters of gasoline, shot down 62 aircraft of all kinds...
The Dien Bien Phu campaign was the largest combined arms offensive campaign of our army in the resistance war against French colonialism. This victory contributed decisively to the bankruptcy of the French colonialists' Navarre Plan and the American intervention. At the same time, it was a victory of decisive significance for the victory of the 9-year long and arduous but extremely heroic, resilient and indomitable resistance war against France of our army and people. Dien Bien Phu marked a brilliant milestone in the history of the nation and the times, becoming a symbol of Vietnamese heroism and strength, a great feat in the history of the nation's resistance against foreign invaders, encouraging the movement against colonialism and national liberation in the world.
The “earth-shaking” victory has made many foreign scholars exclaim, “Dien Bien Phu is the Valmy battle of the colored peoples”; or “In the world, the Waterloo battle is less famous. The fall of Dien Bien Phu caused terrible horrors, signaling the disintegration of the colonies and the end of the republic. The thunder of Dien Bien Phu is still reverberating.”
When analyzing the cause of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the author of the book “Dien Bien Phu - A corner of hell” - Bernard B. Fall - said: “According to Na-va, sacrificing the besieged units allowed the French army to gain time and win. There is no doubt that if the Dien Bien Phu problem were put into an electronic computer, the computer would give the same solution as Na-va. This military theorist did not understand that losing the most elite units of the expeditionary army meant that the fighting spirit of the Indochina soldiers would collapse and the will to continue the war of the mother country would no longer exist. Currently, all of that does not explain how Na-va could have once thought that 9 infantry battalions, of which only 3 were truly elite, could hold out in a hastily built stronghold, against the attack of 3 Viet Minh divisions with unprecedented firepower in Indochina”. And that, “it seems that what Navarre and his staff intended to do at Dien Bien Phu was to turn it into a second Na San, a larger Na San, where the French would eventually win because of their superiority in firepower on land and in the air. Underestimating the strategic and logistical mobility of the Viet Minh in this way must have been the only real mistake Navarre made in preparing for the spring campaign of 1954. But it was a strategic mistake and its consequences were also strategic.”
“During the war of aggression against Vietnam and Indochina (1945-1954), the French Republic had 20 prime ministers overthrown, 7 changes in the High Commissioner, and 8 changes in the commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary force in Indochina. France mobilized a large number of human resources and war expenses: in 1954, the number of French-puppet troops reached 440,000, of which 72% were puppet troops; the war expenses of 9 years of war amounted to nearly 3,000 billion francs, of which US aid accounted for about 1,200 billion francs (equivalent to 2.7 billion dollars). In 1954 alone, US aid accounted for 73.9% of the war expenses. The number of French soldiers killed, wounded, and captured was nearly 600,000 people.” (According to “Vietnam Revolutionary War 1945-1975: Victory and Lessons”). |
With the advantage of a powerful stronghold, the French colonialists were confident of a “happy ending” in Dien Bien Phu. However, that confidence eventually paid a very high price, when Dien Bien Phu became “a corner of hell” for them. De Castries, who was directly assigned to command the Dien Bien Phu stronghold, bitterly realized the reason for the failure, saying: “One can defeat an army, but one cannot defeat a nation”. The Dien Bien victory was famous in history and amazed mankind, an epic about one of the greatest miracles of the 20th century. That victory was also the most eloquent and convincing proof of the truth of the Ho Chi Minh era “Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom” and the unstoppable determination of our nation, our people “We would rather sacrifice everything than lose our country, than become slaves”!
Article and photos: Le Dung
(The article uses materials from the book "Chronological history of the Communist Party of Vietnam, volume III: The Party leads the resistance and nation building (1945-1954)", National Political Publishing House).
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