50 years of national reunification: April 12, 1975 - Opening the corridor connecting the Southeast with Dong Thap Muoi

Underground transportation of goods to the battlefield (Photo: Thanh Vinh/VNA)

On April 12, 1975, the armed forces of Zone 8 and Zone 9 opened a corridor connecting the Southeast region to Dong Thap Muoi, controlling important strategic roads in the border area to create conditions for bringing more forces and technical weapons to approach Saigon.

The armed forces of Military Region 9 opened fire and attacked, causing heavy damage to Ba Cang sub-region, Binh Minh sub-region, Dong Thanh sub-region, destroying and forcing the withdrawal of 13 posts, liberating a section of the southern bank of the Hau River.

Vinh Long local troops destroyed the security battalion's rear base and My Thuan sub-region, forcing the withdrawal of 12 outposts.

The Liberation Army used captured 105mm artillery from the enemy to fire at Binh Minh sub-region, Cai Von training school, Tra Noc airport, Phong Dinh sub-region, the US Consulate General in Can Tho , the 4th Military Region - 4th Corps Command Headquarters, and the private residence of Commander of the 4th Tactical Zone Nguyen Khoa Nam.

Along with the activities of the Southwest Wing Corps and the armed forces of Military Region 8 on Highway 4, the attacks of Military Region 9 on the Can Tho and Vinh Tra fronts contributed to holding the enemy in place, gradually isolating the Mekong Delta from Saigon city.

On the same day, the Standing Committee of the Saigon-Gia Dinh City Party Committee issued a Resolution to urgently prepare for the Saigon-Gia Dinh Liberation Campaign.

On the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at a meeting between the Campaign Command and a number of senior officers at the Command Headquarters, there was a suggestion to name the campaign to liberate Saigon city after Uncle Ho. That was a demonstration of the infinite love of the entire Party, the entire people and the entire army for Uncle Ho, the belief and determination to win of the army and people of the whole country, and also a way to express Uncle Ho's heart for his compatriots in the South, who were always "in his heart".

The Campaign Command unanimously sent a telegram to the Politburo requesting to name the general offensive and uprising campaign to liberate Saigon, the largest-scale campaign with the deepest historical significance in the war of national liberation, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign ...

At 7:00 p.m. on April 14, 1975, Telegram No. 37/TK from the Politburo was sent to the front, with the following full text: "Agree to name the Saigon Campaign the Ho Chi Minh Campaign."

General Vo Nguyen Giap and his comrades in the Central Military Commission reviewed the combat plan for the Ho Chi Minh Campaign (Hanoi, April 1975) (Photo: VNA)

In another development, to be determined to keep Xuan Loc, on April 12, 1975, the enemy hastily landed the 1st Airborne Brigade from Saigon at Tan Phong intersection. In the following days, they rearranged their formation in the town and sent the 3rd Marine Corps, the 318th Special Forces Battalion to Trang Bom, the 322nd Special Forces Battalion to Bau Ca, the 315th Battalion to Bau Han, Hill 122, and the 8th Regiment of the 5th Battalion from Lai Khe to Bau Ca.

Thus, the enemy concentrated in this area 50% of the infantry force, 60% of the artillery and most of the tanks and armored vehicles of the 1st Corps along with the total reserve force equivalent to 1 division.

The air force at Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhat airports mobilized an average of 80 sorties per day to directly support the counterattacks. The enemy also used CBU bombs, a type of bomb with great destructive power, banned internationally, to prevent our attacks.

The battle in Xuan Loc was extremely fierce. After 3 days of fighting, although we had captured a number of targets, destroyed a part of the enemy's forces and held a number of important footholds, we had not yet completely destroyed a single battalion of them.

Based on the basic assumption that Xuan Loc is only valuable when connected to Bien Hoa, the Campaign Command advocated establishing a new battle formation, isolating and cutting off Xuan Loc from Bien Hoa by capturing Dau Giay intersection, cutting off Route 1 to block the enemy from Trang Bom, capturing Tan Phong, and cutting off Route 2 to Ba Ria.

Implementing the above policy, the Campaign Command decided to temporarily stop the attack on the town, leaving only a small part of the force to hold the occupied areas and restrain the enemy's diversionary tactics, while the majority of the force moved out, organized to gain experience, and changed the way of fighting to liberate Xuan Loc./.

According to Vietnam+

Source: https://www.vietnamplus.vn/50-nam-thong-nhat-dat-nuoc-ngay-1241975-mo-thong-hanh-lang-noi-dong-nam-bo-voi-dong-thap-muoi-post1027267.vnp

Source: https://baolongan.vn/50-nam-thong-nhat-dat-nuoc-ngay-12-4-1975-mo-thong-hanh-lang-noi-dong-nam-bo-voi-dong-thap-muoi-a193364.html