50 years of the Great Victory of Spring 1975: Creating an interlocking battle formation with the enemy in the Central Highlands

Create an interlocking battle formation with the enemy in preparation for the campaign.

Through research, the Central Highlands Campaign Command found that: In terms of terrain, the Southern Central Highlands is relatively flat and large, favorable for "large combined arms corps and mechanized troops to operate", we have the conditions to mobilize and deploy large-scale forces to break through and destroy key, important targets.

The 17th parallel at Hien Luong bridge over Ben Hai river. Photo: Archive

Traffic between the Central Highlands provinces and from the Central Highlands to the Southeast and the Central coastal provinces is mainly carried out on three routes 14, 19 and 21. When we cut these routes, the enemy in the Central Highlands will be isolated. As for the enemy, they have deployed their forces in the Southern Central Highlands (Buon Ma Thuot town area) in a vulnerable and weak position. Based on the assessment of the situation, the Campaign Command determined: Buon Ma Thuot-Duc Lap is the main direction and area of operation, Duc Lap is the target to attack at the beginning of the campaign.

Implementing the plan, the creation of an interlocking battle formation with the enemy was carried out urgently. In the preparatory step, we attacked and destroyed the positions: Chu Nghe, Le Ngoc, Ea Sup in the direction of Pleiku; Kon Roc, Mang Den and Dak Pet in the direction of Kon Tum, expanding the liberated areas, bringing our forces close to the enemy's towns, cities and important traffic routes. At the end of January 1975, we carried out the direct preparation step. The Campaign Command arranged the force clusters to create an interlocking battle formation with the enemy in the directions: Buon Ma Thuot; Duc Lap-Quang Duc; Road 14-Thuan Man; Road 21; Road 19; Kon Tum and Pleiku.

Our army attacked Buon Ma Thuot town during the Central Highlands Campaign, March 1975. Photo: Archive

Along with implementing the perfect diversionary plan, we successfully organized the creation of an interlocking battle formation with the enemy, occupied valuable positions, flexibly and effectively applied tactical forms and combat methods, stepped up attacks on the enemy, carried out strategic and operational division, completely isolated the enemy in the Central Highlands and determined to attack Buon Ma Thuot according to the plan that the enemy had no defensive reserve.

Create an interlocking battle formation with the enemy in campaign practice

From March 4, 1975, our units continued to step up diversionary activities, maneuvers, deploy forces, and divide the enemy, creating favorable conditions to attack the main target of Buon Ma Thuot. Regiment 95A and Infantry Division 3 cut Route 19, controlling the section from Plei Pon intersection to Binh Khe. Regiment 25 cut Route 21, controlling the section in Dong Chu Cuc. On Route 14, Regiment 9, Division 320 ambushed the enemy at the South of Ea H'leo bridge; Regiment 48 attacked and controlled the Chu Di Re high point and Thuan Man district (80km north of Buon Ma Thuot); Division 10 attacked Duc Lap district (50km southwest of Buon Ma Thuot). Division 968 cut Route 14 between Kon Tum and Pleiku.

Saigon people celebrate victory day April 30, 1975. Photo: Archive

By March 9, we had completed the creation of an interlocking battle formation that separated the Central Highlands from the Central Plains and the Southeast, and the South from the North of the Central Highlands. Buon Ma Thuot was completely isolated and tightly surrounded.

After capturing Buon Ma Thuot, from the expectation that the enemy could only use reserve forces to reinforce by airborne landing (because the land route to the Central Highlands was completely cut off by us), along with consolidating the interlocking battle formation to isolate and contain the enemy in the Northern Central Highlands, the Campaign Command urgently directed and commanded the mobile forces, deploying them to be ready to fight the enemy's airborne landing. The 10th Division coordinated with a part of the 316th Division to capture bases 45, 53, Hoa Binh and Chu Nga airports, which were areas the enemy could take advantage of to land troops to counterattack and recapture Buon Ma Thuot.

The 320th Division attacked to the North (bordering Ea H'leo), controlling 80km of Route 14 and concentrating anti-aircraft firepower to the East of the town. Armored tank units moved into assembly positions and prepared new attack routes in the direction of Buon Ma Thuot-Lac Thien-Phuoc An. Thanks to careful interlocking and interlocking battle preparations, from March 12 to 18, 1975, we destroyed the main force of the 23rd Division and the remnants of the 53rd Regiment and the 21st Ranger Group.

Faced with the unsalvageable situation in the Central Highlands, the enemy decided to withdraw its remaining forces here along Route 7 to defend the coastal plain. On the night of March 16, 1975, the Campaign Command used the 320th Division, reinforced by an armored battalion, the 95B Regiment, and a campaign artillery group to pursue the enemy. To create an interlocking battle formation with the enemy, the units quickly maneuvered, organized to block, and attack the fleeing enemy on Route 7. From March 17 to 24, our units quickly cut through the forest to block and attack the enemy in Cheo Reo, killing and capturing about 10,000 of them; caught up with, surrounded, and destroyed the enemy in Phu Tuc; blocked and attacked the enemy in Cung Son, killing and capturing about 6,000 of them... The pursuit, destroying and capturing all the fleeing enemy troops on Route 7, won a great victory.

Promoting the role of local forces in coordination with main units

During the Central Highlands Campaign, the coordination with local forces in creating an interlocking battle formation with the enemy was carried out closely and uniformly; local forces played a good role, contributing to the effective combat of the main force. During the campaign preparation stage, the armed forces of Dak Lak, Kon Tum and Gia Lai provinces coordinated with the main force deployed in force clusters, effectively participating in diversionary activities, luring the enemy to the Northern Central Highlands and encircling, dividing and isolating the enemy in the Southern Central Highlands.

General Vo Nguyen Giap and key officials discussed combat plans at the General Headquarters. Photo: Archive

During the attack on Buon Ma Thuot town and the fight against the airborne enemy in Nong Trai-Phuoc An, our local forces stepped up political struggle, eliminated traitors, participated in the pursuit of enemy remnants, carried out enemy agitation work... effectively supporting the combat operations of the main force troops. When the enemy retreated on Route 7, the local forces actively coordinated and cooperated, creating conditions for our main force troops to catch up, block and attack and destroy them in Cheo Reo, Phu Tuc, Cung Son, liberating Phu Bon, Phu Nhon, My Trach... achieving great victories./.

Source: https://baonghean.vn/50-nam-dai-thang-mua-xuan-1975-tao-the-tran-xen-ke-cai-rang-luoc-voi-dich-tren-tay-nguyen-10295830.html